THE PASSIONS
Of the SOULE
In three Books.

The first,
Treating of the Passions in Generall, and occasionally of the whole nature of man.
The second,
Of the Number, and order of the Passions, and the explication of the six Primitive ones.
The third,
Of Particular Passions.

By R. des Cartes.

And Translated out of French into English.

May 24 LONDON,
Printed for A.C. and are to be sold by J. Martin, and J. Ridley, at the Castle in Fleet-street neer Ram-Alley, 1650.
An Advertisement to the Reader by a friend of the Author.

His Book having been sent to me by Monsieur des Cartes, with a Licence to get it printed, and annex what Preface to it I pleased: I thought my selfe, that it was not necessary to put any, unless the Letters I have heretofore written to him, to get it from him, seeing they contain many things, fit to be publicly known.

The first Letter to Monsieur des Cartes.

SIR, I should have been very glad to have seen you this last Summer at Paris, because I thought you would have come thither on purpose to stay there, and that having more conveniences there than any where else to try experiments, whereof you have intimated you stand in need to finish the Treatises you promised to the world, you would not fail to keep your word with
with me, and wee should shortly see them printed; but you have utterly defeated me of that joy, by your return to Holland: and I cannot here refrain from telling you, that I am angry with you, for not letting me (before you took your journey) see the Treatise of the Passions, which, I was told, you had compiled. Besides, reflecting on some words I had read in a Preface some two years since ushering the translation of your Principles into French, wherein after you had spoken succinctly of the parts of Philosophy yet to be discovered, before the chief fruit thereof can be gathered, and said, that you do not so much mistrust your own strength, but you dare undertake to make them all known if you had conveniences to try experiments to maintain, and justify your arguments, you add, greater expences are necessary for that purpose, than a private man, as you are, is able to defray unless assisted by the publicke: but that since you could not expect this assistance, you thought to rest contented from hence forwards with studying for your own private instruction; and that politeness should excuse you, if you left off labours for them: now I am afraid in good earnest that you will envy the world the rest of your inventions, and wee never shall have anything else of you, if we let you follow your own inclination. This is the reason why I bethought me to torment you a little with this Letter, and revenge my self of your refusall of that treatment of the Passions to me, by ingenuously reproving you for lazinesse and other faults, which, I conceive, hinder you from improving your talent, as you may, and your duty binds you. Upon my word, I cannot think it any thing but your lazinesse, and little care to be serviceable to mankind, which cauleth you not to go forwards with your Physick: for though I very well understand it is impossible for you to finish them without many experiments, which ought to be defrayed by the publicke, because they will reap the profit of it, and a private mans estate is not sufficient to do it; yet I do not believe that is your Reformer, for you cannot choose but obtain from the dispensers of the publicke treasure, all you can wish to that purpose, if you would but vouchsafe to make known to them how the case stands, as you easily might do, had you a will to it; but you have ever lived in a way so repugnant thereunto, that there is reason to suspect that you would not accept assistance from any one, though it were offered to you; and yet you pretend, politeness shall excuse you, if you take pains for it no more, on a supposition that this assistance is necessary, and you cannot get it; which gives me occasion to think, not only that you are too sparing of your pains, but, it may be, that you have not courage enough to hope to goe through with what they who have read your writings expect of you; and yet you are so vainglorious as to persuade our successors,
that you failed not of it by any fault of your own, but because your virtue was not encouraged as it ought to have been, and you were denied furtherance in your designs; wherein, I see, your ambition hits the mark it aimed at because they who hereafter shall view your works, will conceive by what you published a dozen years agoe, that you then had found out all that since hath been seen to come from you, and what remains to be investigated in Physick, is lesse difficult then what you have already made known: so that you might since have given us all that may be expected from humane reason concerning Physick, and other necessaries of life, if you had had conveniences to make experiments requir'd thereto: nay, that you have found out a good part of them too, but a just indignation against the ingratitude of man hath dissuaded you from letting them participate of your inventions; so you think that by lying still for ever, you shall acquire as much reputation, as if you took pains for it; and it may be, more, because commonly good possesed is more valued then what is desired, or lamented. But I'll debar you from getting reputation without deserving it; and though I doubt not but you knew well enough what you should have done, if you would have been helped by the publicke: for indeed, I will cause this Letter to be printed, that you may not pretend ignorance of it; that if after you fail to satisfy us, you may no more impute it to this age; for know, it is not enough to obtain any thing from the publicke, to have blurted out an occasionall word of it in the Preface of a book, not absolutely saying that you desire it, and expect it, nor giving them proofs not only that you deserve it, but that they ought for their own sakes to grant it you, in regard they expect great profit by it; It is usually seen, that they, who think they have any thing in them, make such a noise of it, and so importunately demand what they pretend to, and promise so farre beyond what they can perform, that when a man only speaks modestly of himself, and requires nought from any man, nor promises any thing certainly, what proofe soever hee gives otherwise of his sufficiency, hee is neither looked nor thought on.

You'll say, it may bee, that it goes against your nature to request any thing, or speak advantageously of your self; because, one lears a mark of a mean spirit, the other of Pride. But, say I, this humour is to be corrected, for it proceeds from an error of weaknes, rather then a becoming shamefacedness and modesty; for, for matter of requests, a man hath no reason to be ashamed of any, unlese such as hee makes merely for his own peculiar benefit, to those from whom in justice hee ought not to exact any. So far should hee be, from being
being of those that tend to the publique utilite and profit of them to whom they are made, that on the contrary, hee may extract glory from them, especially when hee hath already bestowed things on them worth much more than hee would obtain of them; and for speaking advantageously of a mans selfe, it is true, it is a most ridiculous, and blameable pride, when hee speaks false things of himselfe; and it is even a contemptible vanity, too, when hee speaks only truths, mostly out of ostentation, and so that no good accrew to any one thereby; but when these things so much concern other men to know, it is most certain they cannot be concealed, but out of a vicious humility, which is a sort of baseness, and weakness. Now, it highly concerns the publique to be advertised of what you have gathered in Sciences, that thereby judging what you are able to discover in them futher, it may be incited to contribute its utmost to help you therein, as in a work whose end is the generall good of mankind, and the things you have already given, the important truths, you have laid down in your Books, are worth incomparably much more than anything you can ask for this purpose.

You may also say that your works speak enough, and there is no need of adding promises and brags, which being the merchandize of juggling Mountebanks seem not becoming a man of honour, who only searcheth after truth; but Mountebanks are not blame-worthy for talking high and well of themselves, but for speaking untruths, and things they cannot make good; whereas those which (I urge) you should speak of your self, are so true, and so manifestly proved in your writings, that the strictest rules of modesty give you leave to ascertain them, and those of Charity oblige you thereunto, because it concerns others to know it. For although your writings say enough to those who examine them throughly, and are able to understand them; yet that is not sufficient for the designe I would advise you to, because every one is not able to read them, and they who manage the publique affaires can scarce have any leisure to doe it. It may be, some who have read them, tell them of it: but whatsoever a man say to them of it, the little coile, they know, you keep, and the too great modesty you have ever observd in speaking of your self, make them not take any great notice thereof. And indeed because it a usuall thing among them to bestow the highest termes imaginable on the commendation of very indifferent men, they are not apt to receive the immense praises bestowed on you by those who know you, for exact truths; whereas when any man speaks of himselfe extraordinarily, they hearken to him with more attention, especially if hee be a man of good birth.

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and they know him to bee: neither by nature, nor his rank, likely to act the mountebank; and because hee would become ridiculous if he should use hyperbolies on such an occasion, his words are taken in their true sense: and they who will not believe them are incited at least by their curiosity, or jealousy, to examine the truth of them; wherefore it being most certain, and the publick being much concerned in knowing that no man in the world but your selfe (at least whose writings wee have) ever discovered the true principles; and understood the first causes of whatever is produced in nature; and that having already given an account by these Principles, of all those things which are most visible, and frequently observed in the world, you need only some particular observations to find out, in like manner, the reasons of whatsoever may be useful to man in this life, and so give us a compleat knowledge of the nature of all minerals, the virtues of all Plants, the properties of animals, and generally all that may be beneficial to Phyicks, or other arts. And lastly, that these particular observations not being possible to bee all made in a small time without great expence, all people of the earth ought emulously to contribute thereunto, as to the most important thing in the world, wherein they have all an equal interest. This being, I say, most certain, to bee sufficiently proved by your works already printed, you should talk so loud of it, publish it with so much care, and put it so punctually in all the title-pages of your Books, that none hereafter might pretend ignorance. So at least, you would immediately beget a longing in many to examine what the matter is: so that the further they enquired into it, and the more diligently they read your Books, they would the more clearly understand you not unjustly boasted.

And I would wish you chiefly to clear these things to the world. First, that there are a numerous company of things to be found out in Phyicks, that may bee extremely profitable for life: Secondly, that there is great reason to expect the finding them out from you: And thirdly, that the more conveniences you had to make experiments, the more of them you could find out; It is necessary to be informed of the first, because most men think there can nothing be found out in the Sciences, better then what hath been found by the Ancients; and some conceive not so much as what the meaning of Phyicks is, or what they are good for. Now it is easie to prove that the too great reverence born to antiquity, is an errour extremely prejudicial to the advancement of Sciences. For it is seen that the savage people of America, and many others who inhbitte places leaße remote, have many lesse conveniences of life then wee, yet their originall is as ancient as ours, so that they have as,
as much reason as wee to say that they are satisfied with the wisdome of their fathers, and that they believe no man can teach them better than what hath been known and practised among them from all Antiquity. And this opinion is so prejudiciall, that till it be rejected, it is impossible any new learning can be acquired: besides, experience shewes, that the people whose mind it is deepest rooted in, are they who are yet most ignorant, and least civilized; and because it is frequent enough yet amongst us, that may be one reason to prove, that wee are farre from knowing all wee are capable of; Which may be proved by many exceeding profitable inventions, as the use of the Compasse, the Art of Printing, Perspective glasses, and the like, which were not found out till these latter ages, although now they seem very easie to those that know them. But there is nothing, wherein our necessity of acquiring new knowledge is more apparent than in Physick: For although no man doubts that God hath furnished this earth with all things necessary for man, to conserve him therein in perfect health until an extreme old age; and although there be nothing in the world so defined as these things, so that heretofore it hath bin the study of Kings and Sages; yet experience shews, wee are so far from having it wholly, that oftentimes a man is chained to his bed by small diseas, which the most learned Physicians understand not, and only make them rage more by their remedies, when they undertake to expell them. Wherein the defect of their art, and the necessity of perfecting it, is so evident, that for those who understand not what the meaning of Physicks is, it is enough to tell them, that it is the Science which should teach so perfectly to understand the nature of man, and all things that may serve him for nutriment or remedies, that it might be easie for him thereby to exempt himselfe from all kinds of disease; for not to speake of any other uses thereof, this alone is weighty enough, to oblige the most infensible to favour the designes of a man, who hath already proved by the things he hath already found out, that there is great reason to expect from him the unfound remainder of that Science.

But there is an extraordinary necessity that the world should know, you have proved that your selfe: and to this end it is requisite you use a little violence to your own nature, and banish that too great modesty, which hath hitherto hindered you from speakinge what you are bound to doe: both of your selfe and others. Yet I mean not therefore to commit you to the learned of this age; the most part of those, on whom this name is conferred, will, those who cultivate (as they commonly call it) good literature, and the Lawyers have not anything to doe in what I would have have you talk off. Divines and Physicians have as little too, unlesse in the notion of Philo-
Philosophers: for Divinity depends not a jot on Physickes, nor yet Physick as at this day it is practised by the most learned and prudent in that Art: they are contented to follow the maximes and rules that a long experience hath taught them, and doe not so much confine the lives of men, as to leave their judgement, whereon it often depends, on the uncertain ratiocinations of Schoole-Philosophy: none then but the Philosophers are unsatisfied, among whom all who have wit are on your side, and would rejoice to see your manumit truth, so that the malignity of Pedants might not be able to oppose her: for none but meere Pedants can be angry at what you have to say: and in regard they are the laughing-flock and contempt of most well bred men, you need not stand much on their displeasure: besides, your reputation hath made them already as much your enemies as they can be: and whereas your modesty now caueth some of them not to fear to set upon you, I am confident, would you but extoll yourselfe as you might, and ought, they would see themselves so far beneath you, that there is not one of them but would be ashamed to undertake you. I see no reason, then, that may detain you from boldly publishing, whatsoever you may judge serviceable to your designe: and nothing seemes to me better for it then what you have already written in a letter to the reverend Father Diner, which you caused to be printed seven yeares since, when he was Provinciall of the Jesuites of France. Non igitur, sed igitur negligentius, sed plus ser- centis questionibus, qua sic amicis ante me sive suae reser- tate explicate: ac quamvis multi haec mens scripta superius fisc acutis inflex erit, modi quisque omnibus refutare consci sunt, nemo tamen, quod sciam, quocumque non veram potius in se re- perite: siat enumeratio questionum omnium, quae in tot facultates, quibus alia Philosophia viguerant, ipsarum ope solutae sunt, et forte nesciante, nesciante illustres inventur. Quaie mihi profecerit, ne vix quisque questionis solutionem, ope principalium Peripatetici Philosophie peculiarem, datam unquam suffusse, quae non posset demonstrare esse illegitima, et falsa esse. Si tamen, ut periculum, promovatur, non quisque omnes (neque enim organum, quod accipit igitur iniuria, sed aliumque sectorem, stabo promisi- fis, etc. Thus in spight of all your modesty, the force of truth hath compelled you there, to write that you had stated in your first Essayes, which containe nought amlost but the Dioptrick and the meteors, above 600 questions of Philo- sophy, which none before you knew how to do, and that although many looks acquite upon your writings, and taught all manner of wayes to confute them, yet you knew not hitherto any who had pickt any untruth out of them: whereto you subjoin, that if all the questions resol


solved by all other kinds of Philosophy, which have been in vogue since the world began were reckoned up one by one, they would not, it may be, be found so numerous, nor so eminent. Furthermore, you assure us, that by those principles, peculiar to the Philosophy attributed to Aristotle, which once was taught in the Schools, no man ever yet knew how to find out the true solution of any one question; and you absolutely deny all those who teach it to name any one plainly resolved by them, in the solution whereof you cannot demonstrate some error: now, these things having been written to a Provincial, of the Jesuits, and published above seven yeare since, there is no doubt but some of the ablest of that great society, would have endeavoured to confute them, had not they been perfectly true, or if they could have been but so much as disputed with any colour of reason: for notwithstanding the little noise you make, all men know your reputation is already so great, & they are so much interested to maintain, that what they teach is not bad, they can not pretend to say they defeated it: but all the learned know well enough, that there is nothing in the Phisickes of the School, but what is dubious; and they know with all, that to be dubious in such a matter, is not much better than to be false, because a science ought to be certaine, and demonstrative: so that they cannot think strange, that you assure them their Phisickes containe not the true solution of any one question; for that signifies no more, but that it contains not the demonstration of any unknown truth; and if any one examines your writings to confute them, he finds on the other side, that they contain nothing but demonstrations, concerning matters formerly unknown to all the world: wherefore being wise and advised, I wonder not that they hold their peace, but I marvel why you have not vouchsafed to take advantage of their silence, because you could not have wished anything more to make it apparent how much difference there is betwixt your Phisicke & others. And it is very important to observe the difference of them, that the ill opinion of those who are employed in the state, and are most successfully, usually have of Philosophy, hinder them not from understanding the worth of yours: for they commonly conjecture what shall befall, by what they have already seen to happen; and because they never saw the publike reape any benefit by School Philosophy, unless that it hath made many Pedants, they cannot imagine better is to be expected from yours, unless they are brought to consider that this being altogether true, and that utterly false, their fruits must be different. In earnest, it is a strong argument to prove there is no truth in School Phisickes, but to say it is instituted to teach all inventions profitable for life, and nevertheless, though there have many been found out from time to time, yet it never was by the means of any of these.
these Physickes, but only by chance, or custom: or if any Science have contributed thereunto, it hath been only the Mathematicks: which alone of all humane Sciences hath been able to prove some indubitable truths. I know well enough, the Philosophers admit that for one branch of their Physickes; but in regard they were almost all of them ignorant in it, and it was no part of it, but on the other side true Physickes were a part of the Mathematicks, this can make nothing for them: but the certainty already discovered in the Mathematicks makes much for you: for it is a Science wherein you are acknowledged to be so excellent, and you have therein so over-topped envy, that even those who are jealous of your estimation for other Sciences, use to say you surpass all men in this, that by granting a commendation which they knew cannot be disputed, they may be feign suspected of calumny, when they endeavour to rob you of others: and it is seen by what you have published concerning Geometry, that you there do determine how far humane capacity can reach, and which is the way of solving every manner of scruple, that it seems you have reached the whole harvest, whereof those who write before you have onely cropped some ears: and your successfours can be but gleaners, who shall gather up onely those you were pleased to leave them: besides, you have shewn, by the sudden and easie solution of all questions, which those who have tried you have propounded to you, that the Method you use for this purpose is so infallible, that you never fail to find thereby, what ever the wit of man can, belonging to the things you seek after: so that to make it undoubted that you are able to bring Physickes to the highest perfection, you are only to prove, them to be a part of the Mathematicks, and you have already proved it plainly enough in your principles: when explaining all sensible Qualities, considering only their greatness, figures, and motions, you shewed, that the visible world, which is all the object of Physickes, contains only a small part of the infinite bodies whereof the proprieties or Qualities may be imagined, consists only of these very things whereas the object of the Mathematicks contains all; the same may also be proved by the experience of all ages: for although from time to time many of the best wits, have bestowed their time in the investigation of Physick, as it can not be said that any of them ever discovered ought (that is, attained any true knowledge of the nature of corporeall things) by any principle, that belonged not to the Mathematicks: whereas, by those belonging to them, abundance of very useful all things have been found out, to wit, almost all that is known of Astronomy, Chirurgery, and all Mechanical arts: wherein, if there be anything more then what belongs to this Science, it is not drawn from any other, but onely from certain obser-
vations, whose true causes are unknown; which cannot be considered seriously, but it must be confessed, that the knowledge of true Physicks is to be attained no way but by the Mathematicks; and your excellence in this not being doubted, there is nothing but may be expected from you in that; yet there remains one temple, for that it is seen that all who have acquired some reputation in the Mathematicks, are not, for all that, capable to find out any thing in Physicks, nay, and some of them least comprehend the things you have written there of, than many who never learnt any Science at all: but it may be answered, that although undoubtedly they who have wits aptest to conceive the truths of the Mathematicks, are they who easiest understand your Physicks. By reason all the arguments of these are deducted from the other; it happens not always that these men have the greatest reputation for the most learned in the Mathematicks; because to acquire this reputation it is necessary to study the books of those who heretofore have written of this Science, which the most do not, and oftentimes, those who do, endeavouring to attain by labour what they cannot by the strength of their wit, tire out their imagination, yea, hurt it, and acquire thereby many prejudices, which hinder them much more from conceiving the truths you write, than passing for great Mathematicians; because so few men apply themselves to this Science, that oftimes there is but one of them in a whole Country; and though sometimes there be more, they keep a great fir with it, in regard the little they understand hath cost them a great deal of pains. Now, it is not uneasie to apprehend the truths another man hath discovered: it is sufficient for that, that the brain be disengaged of all sorts of prejudices, and be willing to afford attention to them; nor is it difficult to find some of a contrary bias to the rest, as heretofore Thales, Pythagoras, and Archimedes, and in our age Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey, and some others. Lastly, a man may, without much pains, imagine a body of Philosophy, of monstrous, and grounded on conjectures more conformable to truth, than that which is extracted from the writings of Aristotle, which hath been done too by some in this age: but to frame one that contains only truths proved by demonstrations as clear and certain as those of the Mathematicks, there is none but you alone who have shewed us by your writings that you could compasse it. But as when an Architect hath laid all the foundations, & erected the chief walls of some vast building, none doubts that he is able to finish his designe, because it is seen; that he hath already done the hardest part of it; so those who attentively have read your book of Principles, considering how you have there laid all the foundations of natural Philosophy, and how great are the consequences of truths which you have therein exhibited, cannot doubt, that the Method
Method you use is sufficient, whereby you may make an end of finding out the utmost that can be discovered in Physicks: because the things which you have already made known to wit the nature of the Loadstone, fire, air, water, earth, and all that appears in the heavens, seem not to be less difficult than those which may be desired.

Yet I must addde here, that let an Architect be never so expert in his art, it is impossible he should finish the edifice he hath begun, if materials requisite are deficient; in like manner let your method be never so exact, yet you cannot make any further progress in the explication of natural causes, unless you be able to make requisite experiments to determine their effects; which is the last of the three things, I believe, ought chiefly to be explained, because most men conceive not how necessary experiments are, nor what expense they require; those who, not sitting out of their study, not casting their eyes on anything but their books, undertake to discourse of nature, may well tell how they would have created the world, had God given them authority, and power to do it; that is, they might describe Chimera's that have as much Analogy with the imbecilitie of their wit, as the admirable beauty of this Universe, with the infinite puissance of its Maker: but without a spirit truly divine, they cannot of themselves frame an Idea of things, like that which God had to create them. And though your Method promise all that may be hoped for from humane wit, concerning the enquiry after truth in the Sciences, yet it doth not promise to teach Prophecies; but to deduce from certain things laid down, all truths that may from thence be deducted: and the things laid down in Physicks can be nothing but experiments. Moreover, because experiments are of two sorts; some easy, that depend only on the reflexion a man makes on things presented to the senses of themselves; others, more rare and difficult, which are not attained without some study, and expense: it may be observed, that you have already inferred in your writings all that seems may be gathered out of easy experiments, and also the rarest too, that you could learn out of books: For besides your explaining the nature of all qualities that move the senses, and the most ordinary bodies on the earth, as fire, air, water, and some others in them, you have also therein given an account of all that hath been observed hitherto in the heavens, of all the properties of the Loadstone, and many Chymical observations; so that there is no reason to expect any more from you concerning Physicks, till you have made more experiments, whereof you might enquire the causes: And I wonder not, that you undertake not to try these experiments at your own charges; For, I know, the enquiring after the smallest things cost a great deal: and not to quote Chymists, nor the rest of the hunters after secrets, who use to
to undoe themselves at that trade, I heard say that the Loadstone only cost Gilbert above 5000 crowns, though he were a man of very great parts, as he hath shewed, by being the first who discovered the chief properties of that stone.

I have also seen the Advancement to Learning, and the New Atlantis, of my Lord Chancellor Bacon, who, of all them that have written before you, seems to me the man who had the best notions, concerning the method to be held to bring the Physicks to their perfection; but the whole Revenue of two or three of the richest Kings on the earth, would not be enough to let all things he requires for this purpose on work.

And although I think you do not need so many sorts of experiments as hee imagines because you may supply many, as well by your dexterity, as the knowledge of truths you have already found: yet considering that the number of particular bodies unexamined, is almost infinite, that there is not any one but hath a great many several properties, and whereof several trials may be made, to take up the time, and labour of many men; that according to the rules of your method, it is necessary at once to examine all things who have any affinitie between them, the better to mark their differences, and to make such quantities as you may be assured, that so you may profitably make use at the same time of more several experiments, than the labour of a great many able men could furnish you withal, and lastly, that you cannot get these able men but at a great rate, because if some would employ themselves gratis, they would not be obedient enough to your orders, and would only give you occasion to lose time: considering, I say, all these things, I easily comprehend, you cannot hastedly finish the designe you have begun in your principles, that is, particularly to lay open the nature of all Minerals, Plants, animals and man, as you have already done all the elements of the earth, and all observable in the heavens, unless the publique defray the expences necessary for that purpose; and the more liberal they shall be to you, the better you shall be able to goe through with your designe.

Now, because all these things may be easily comprehended by everyone, and are all so true, they cannot be doubted, I am confident, that if you represented them in such a manner, as they might come to the knowledge of those, to whom God hath given power to command the people of the earth, and charge also to doe their utmost to advance the common good, there is none of them but would contribute to a designe so manifestly profitable to the whole world; and though our France, which is your Country, he so mighty a State, that you might easily obtain from her alone whatsoever is requisite to this purpose, yet because other Nations are no less interested therein than shee, I am confident many would be generous enough not to give he.
place in that duty: and that there would not
any bee so barbarous as not to put in a hand.

But if all that I have written be not enough
to make you of another humour, pray, at least
oblige me so farre as to send me your Treatise
of the Passions, and give me leave to adde a
Preface to it, wherewith it may be printed. I
will see: it shall be so done, that there shall be
nothing you can dislike in it, but it shall be so
conformable to the resentiment of all those who
have either wit or vertue, that no man after he
hath read it, but shall participate in the zeale I
have to the advancement of Sciences, and to
be, &c.

Paris, Nov. 6. 1648.

In answer to the precedent letter.

Sir,

Among the many injuries and taunts I find in
the long letter you tooke the paines to write to
me, I observe so many things to my advantage,
that should you put it to be printed, as you declare
you will, I am afraid, it would be imagined there
were a greater combination betwixt us than there
is; and I had entreated you to insert many things
that modesty would not suffer me myself to pub-
lishe to the world. Wherefore I will not here insist in
answering every particular, I will only tell you
two reasons that, I thinke, might deterre you from
from it: the first is, I have not any conceit, that
the desighe, I suppose, you had in writing it can
succeed: the second, that I am no whit of that
humour you suppose me, that neither indignation
nor dissatisfie hath taken away my desire to be ser-
viciable to the publick, whereunto I think my
selfe very much obliged, for that those things I
have already published, have been by many favour-
ably received. That I did not formerly bestow
what I had written of the Passions on you, was
because I would not be engaged to let some others
see it who would have made no use of it: for since
I compiled it to be read onely by a Princesse whose
wit is so far above the common pitch, that she con-
scives without difficulty what seems hardest to
our Doctours; I only purposed to unfold what
therein was new. And that you may not doubt
what I say; I promise you to review that tract of
the Passions, and to add what I conceive necessary
to make it more intelligible, and then, I will
send it to you, to doe what you pleasure with it: for I
am, &c.

Egmont. Dec. 4. 1648.
A second letter to Mousier des Cartes.

Sir,

It is a long while since you have made me expect your tract of the Passions, which I begin to despair of, and fancy with myself, that you promised it to me, solely to hinder me from publishing the letter I formerly wrote to you: for I have reason to believe, that you would be very jealous if a man went about to barre you of the excuse you make to finish your Physickes: and my designe in that letter was to barre you, since the reasons I have there laid down, are such, that men think they cannot be read by any one, who hath the least scruple of respect to honour or vertue, but they will incite him to think as I do, that you might obtaine of the publique what is requisite for the experiments you say are necessary; and I hoped it might haply alight into the hands of some, who had power to make that desire effectual, whether because they had access to those who dispose the publique treasure, or because they dispense it themselves: so I was confident I should find you doing, whether you would or no: for I know you have to great a harm that you would not fail to repay what should thus be given you, with usury, and that would make you absolutely shake off that carelesnesse, whereof at present I cannot refrain from accusing you, although I am, &c.

July 23. 1649.

In answer to the second Letter.

Sir, I am very guilelesse of the slights you are pleased to believe I used, to hinder the last Letter you sent me last year from being published: for besides, that I cannot think it can any wise produce the effect you pretend, I have not such a propension to idlenesse, that the fear of labour whereby I should be tied, were I to dive into many experiments, could prevail over the desire I have to instruct my selfe, and write any thing usefull for other men, had I from the publique received conveniences to doe it. I cannot so well cleare my selfe of the carelesnesse you charge me with: for I confess, I have beene longer in reviewing the little tract I send you, than I was in making it, and yet I have added to it but very few things, and have not a whit altered the discourse, which is so plain and briefe, that it will be easily known there by, my designe was not to lay open the Passions like an Orator, nor yet a Morall Philosopher, but
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The first part.

Of Passions in Generall: and occasionally of the Universall nature of Man.

The first Article.

That what is Passion in regard of the subject, is always Action in some other respect.

Here is nothing more clearly evinces the Learning which we receive from the Ancients to be defective, than what they have written concerning the Passions. For although it be a matter the understanding whereof hath ever been hunted after: and that it seems to be none of the hardest, because every one feeling them in himself, need not borrow foraign observations to discover their nature: yet what the:
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the Ancients have taught concerning them, is so little, and for the most part so little credible, that I cannot hope to draw nigh truth, but by keeping a loaf off from those roads which they followed. Wherefore I shall here be forced to write in such a fort, as if I treated of a matter never before handled. And first of all I consider, that all which is done, or happens anew, is by the Philosophers called generally a Passion in relation to the subject on whom it befalls, and an Action in respect of that which causes it. So that although the Agent and Patient be things often differing, Action and Passion are one and the same thing, which hath two several names, because of the two several subjects whereunto they may relate.

The second Article.

That to understand the Passions of the soul, it is necessary to distinguish the functions thereof from those of the body.

Furthermore, I consider that we observe not any thing which more immediately agitates our soul, than the body joined to it, & consequently we ought to conceive that what in that is a Passion, is commonly in this an Action; so that there is no better way to attain to the understanding of our Passions, than by examining the difference between the soul and the body.

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That we may know to which of them each function in us ought to be attributed.

The third Article.

What rule ought to be observed for the purpose.

Which will not be found a very hard task, if it be taken notice of, that what we experimentally find to be in us, and which we see are in bodies totally inanimate, ought not to be attributed to ought else but the body; and contrarily, that all which is within us, and which we conceive cannot in any ways appertain to a body must be imputed to our soul.

The fourth Article.

That heat, and the motion of the members proceed from the Body, and thoughts from the Soul.

Wherefore since we do not comprehend that the body in any manner thinks, 'tis but equitable in us to believe that all sorts of thoughts within us belong to the soul; and since we make no question but there are inanimate bodies which move as many or more several ways than ours, and which have as much or more heat (which experience shows us in flame, which alone hath more heat).
heat and motion than any of our limbs) we may be assured that heat and all the motions within us, seeing they depend not on the mind, belong only to the body.

The fifth Article.

That it is an error to believe the Soul gives motion and heat to the body.

Whereby we shall eschew a very considerable error which many have fallen into so farre, that I believe it the cause of hindering the Passions, and other things which belong to the soul from being explained hitherto. It is this, that seeing all dead bodies are deprived of heat, and consequently of motion, people imagine the absence of the soul wrought this cessation of motion and heat, and so erroneously conceive that our naturall heat, and all the motions of our body depend on the soul: whereas indeed the contrary should be supposed that the soul absent it self in death, only because this naturall heat ceaseth, and the organs which seem to move the body are corrupted.

The sixth Article.

What is the difference betwixt a living, and a dead body.

That we may then avoid this error. Let us consider that death never comes by any defect of the soul, but only because some one

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one of the principal parts of the body is corrupted; and conceive that the body of a living man differs as much from that of a dead one, as a watch or any other AUTOMA (that is any kind of Machine that moves of it self) wound up, having in it self the corporeal principle of those motions for which it was instituted, with all things requisite for its action, and the saine watch or other engine when it is broken, and the principle of its motion ceases to act.

The seventh Article.

A brief explication of the parts of the body, and of some of its functions.

To make this more intelligible, I will in few words display the pieces and lineaments, whereof this Machine our body is composed. There is none that doth not already know there is within us, a heart, a braine, a stomach, muscles, sinews, arteries, veins, and the like; it is as commonly known, that meats eaten descend into the stomach, and bowells, from whence the juice of them trickling into the liver, and all the veins, mixeth it self with the blood in them, and by this means augments the quantity thereof. Those who have heard talk never so little of Physick, know besides this, how the Heart is composed, and how all the blood of the veins may with facility drop into the hollow vein, on the right side of it, and from thence passe into the Liver.
Liver, by a vessel called the venous arterie, then return from the liver into the left side of the heart, through the Pipe, called the arterious vein, and at length passe from thence into the great arterie, the branches whereof spread themselves all over the body. Yea even all those whom the authority of the Ancients hath not totally blinded, and who have vouchsafed to open their eyes to examine the opinion of Harvey, concerning the circulation of the blood, make no doubt but all the veins and arteries of the body are like channels, through which the blood continually and easily glides, taking its course from the right cavity of the heart, through the arterious veins, whereof the branches are dispersed into every part of the Liver, and joyned to those of the venous arterie, by which it passeth from the Liver into the left side of the heart, from thence going into the great arterie, the branches whereof being scattered over all the rest of the body are joyned to the branches of the hollow vein which carry the same blood again into the right cavity of the heart: so that the two cavities are as it were the fluxes of it, through each of which all the blood passeth, every round it walks about the body. Moreover it is notorious that all the motions of the members depend upon the muscles, and that these Muscles are opposite to one another in such a manner, that when one of them shrinks up, it draws after it that part of the body whereof it is knit, which causes the muscle opposite to it to stretch forth at the same time. Then again if at another time this last shrink up, the first gives way, suffering the other to attract that part it is joyned unto. In fine, it is knowne that all these motions of the muscles, as also all the sinews depend on the fine ws, which are as little strings, or like small tunnels coming all from the braine, and containing as that does a certain aire, or exceeding subtle wind, which is termed the Animall Spirits.

The eighth Article.

_What is the principle of all these functions._

But it is not commonly known in what manner these Animall Spirits, and nerves contribute to these motions and sinews, nor what is the corporeal principle that makes them act: wherefore, although I have already glanced upon it in former writings, I will not here omit to say succinctly, that while we live there is a continual heat in our heart, which is a kind of fire that the blood of the veins feeds, and this fire is the corporeal principle of all the motions of our members.

The ninth Article.

_How the motion of the heart is wrought._

The first effect of it is, that it dilates the blood wherewith the cavities of the heart are fill'd; which is the reason that this blood having need of
of a larger room, passes impetuously from the right cavity into the arterious vein, and from the left into the great artery; then, this dilatation ceasing, immediately new blood from the hollow vein enters into the right cavity of the heart, and from the venous artery into the left; for there are little skins at the entrance of these four vessels so contrived, that they will not let the blood get into the heart, but by the two last, not come out, but by the other two. The new blood being gotten into the heart is there immediately rarified as the former was. Hence only is that pulse or palpitation of the heart and arteries; for this beating is reiterated as often as any new blood gets into the heart. It is also this alone which gives motion to the blood and causeth it unceasingly to run very swiftly in all the arteries and veins; by means whereof it conveyes the heat acquired in the heart, to all the other parts of the body, and is their nutrition.

The tenth Article.

How the animall spirits are begotten in the braine.

But what here is most considerable is, that all the most lively, and subtle parts of the blood that heat hath rarified in the heart, continually enter in abundance into the cavities of the braine, and the reason why they go thither rather than any where else, is, because all the blood that issueth out of the heart by the great artery bends its course in a direct line thitherward, and it not being possible for all to get in, because there are none but very narrow passages, those ends thereof that are the most agitated, and subtillest, only get in, while the rest is dispersed into all the other parts of the body. Now these very subtle parts of the blood make the animall spirits; and they need not, to this end, undergo any other change in the brain, but only be separated from the other lesser subtle parts of the blood; for what I here call spirits, are but bodies, and have no other property, unless that they are bodies exceeding small, which move very nimbly, as the parts of a flame issuing from a torch; so that they stay not in any one place, but still as some get into the cavities of the brain, some others get out through the pores in the substance of it; which pores convey them into the nerves, and from thence into the muscles, by means whereof they mould the body into all the several postures it can move.

The 11th Article.

How the muscles are moved.

For the only cause of the motion of all the members is, that some muscles shrink up, and their opposites extend, as hath been already said; and the only cause why one muscle...
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in both Muscles crowd suddenly into one, so swelling it up, and shortening it, while the other extends itself, and gives.

The 12th Article.

How outward objects act contrary to the organs of the senses.

It remains yet to know the causes why the spirits slide not from the brain into the Muscles always after the same manner, and wherefore they come sometimes more towards some than others; For besides the action of the Soul, which in truth is in us one of the causes, as I shall shew hereafter, there are yet two besides, which depend not of any thing but the body, which it is necessary to take notice of, the first consists in the diversities of motions, excited in the organs of the senses by their objects, which I have already amply enough explained in the Dioptricks: but that those who see this, may not need to have read ought else, I will here repeat, that there are three things to be considered: in the firsts, to wit, their narrow or interiour substance, which stretches it out in the form of little threads from the brain, the original thereof, to the extremities of the other members whereunto these threads are fastened: next, the skins wherein they are lapt, which being continuous with those that envelop the brain, make up little pipes wherein their threads are enclosed; lastly, the animal spirits,
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rits, which being conveyed through these very pipes from the brain to the muscles, are the cause that these threads remain there entirely unmolested, and extended in such a manner, that the least thing that moves that part of the body, whereunto the extremity of any one of them is fastened, both by the same reason move that part of the brain from whence it comes: just as when a man pulls at one end of a string, he causeth the other end to stirre.

The 13th Article.

That this Action of objects without, may differently convey the spirits into the Muscles.

And I have made it evident in the Dioptricks, how all the objects of the sight are not communicated to us any way but thus; they move locally, (by mediation of transparent bodies between them and us) those little threads of the Optick nerves, which are at the bottome of our eyes, and after them, the places of the brain from whence those nerves come: they move them, I say, as many severall kinds of wayes, as there are diversities of objects in things; nor are they immediatly the motions made in the eye, but in the brain, that represent these objects to the Soul: in imitation whereof it is easie to conceive that sounds, odours, heat, pain, hunger, thirst, and generally all objects, as well of our other exteriour senses, as our interiour

our appetites, do also excite some motion in our nerves, which passeth by means of them unto the brain; and besides, that these several motions of the brain create in our soul different resentments, it may be, that that without her, the spirits direct their course rather towards some Muscles than others, and so they may move our members; which I will prove here, only by one example. If any one lift up his hand on a sudden towards our eyes, as if he were about to strike, although we know he is our friend, that he does this only in jest, and that he will be careful enough not to doe us any hurt, yet wee can scarce refrain from shutting them; which shews it is not by the intermedling of our soul that they shut, since it is against our will, which is the only, or at least the principal Action thereof; but by reason this machine of our body is so composed, that the moving of this hand up towards our eyes, excites another motion in our brain, which conveys the animal spirits into those muscles that close the eye-lids.

The 14th Article.

That the diversity of the spirits may diversifie their course.

The other cause which serves to convey the animal spirits variously into the muscles, is the unequal agitation of these spirits, and the diversity of their parts: for when any of their parts
parts are more gross, and agitated than the rest, they passe forwards in a direct line into the cavities, and pores of the brain, and by this means are conveyed into other muscles, Whereinto they should not, had they been weaker.

The 15th Article.

What are the causes of their diversity.

And this inequality may proceed from the divers matters whereof they are composed, as is seen in those who have drunk much wine. The vapours of this wine entering suddenly into the blood, mount up from the heart to the brain, where they convert into spirits, which being stronger, and more abundant than ordinary, are apt to move the body after many strange fashions. This inequality of the spirits may also proceed from the divers dispositions of the heart, liver, stomache, spleene, and all other parts contributing to their production. For it is principally necessary here to observe certaine little nerves inflected in the basis of the heart, which serve to lengthen, and contract the entries of its concavities: by means whereof, the blood there dilating more, or less strongly, produces spirits diversely disposed. It is also to be noted, that although the blood which enters into the heart, comes thither from all the other parts of the body, yet it falls out oftentimes that more is driven thither from some parts than others, by reason

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reason the nerves or muscles which answer to those parts oppress or agitate it more; and for that according to the diversity of the parts from whence it comes most, it dilates it selfe diversely in the heart, and last produces spirits of different natures, as for example, that which comes from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is, dilates it selfe otherwise in the heart, than that which comes from the spleene; and this after another manner than that which comes from the veins of the leggs, or armes and lastly, this quite otherwise than the juice of meats, when being newly come out of the stomack, and bowels, it passe through the liver to the heart.

The 16th Article.

How all the members may be moved by the objects of the senses, and by the spirits, without the help of the Soul.

Lastly, it is to be observed, that the machine of our body is so composed, that all the changes befalling the motion of the spirits may so worke as to open some pores of the braine more than others: and reciprocally, that when any one of these pores are never to little more or less open than ususual by the Action of those nerves subservient to the fenes, it changes somewhat in the motion of the spirits, and causes them to be conveyed into the muscles which serve to move the body in that manner it ordinarily
The 17th Article.
What the functions of the Soul are.

Having thus considered all the functions belonging to the body only, it is easy to know, there remains nothing in us, which we ought to attribute to our Soul, unless our thoughts, which are chiefly of two kinds, to wit, some actions of the Soul, others, her Passions. Those which I call her actions are all our wills, because we experimentally find, they come directly from our Soul, and seem to depend on nature but it: as on the contrary one may generally call her Passions, all those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us, because oftentimes our Soul does not make them such as they are to us, and she always receives things as they are represented to her by them.

The 18th Article.
Of the Will.

Again our Will are of two sorts. For some are actions of the Soul which terminate in the soul it selfe, as when we will love God, or generally apply our thought to any object which is not material. The other are actions which terminate in our Body, as in this case, that we have only a will to walk, it followes that our legs must stir and we goe.

The 19th Article.
Of the Apprehension.

Our Apprehensions also are of two sorts: the Soul is the cause of some, the Body of the other. Tho' whereof the Soul is the cause are the apprehensions of our wills, and all the imaginations or other thoughts thereon depending. For we cannot will any thing, but we must at the same time perceive that we doe will it. And although in respect of our Soul it be an Action to will any thing, it may be said also a passion in her to apprehend that she wills. Yet because this apprehension, and this will are in effect but one, and the same thing, the denomination comes still from that which is most noble: therefore it is not customary to call it a Passion, but only an Action.
Of Imaginations, and other thoughts framed by the Soul.

When our Soul applies her selfe to fancy any thing which is not, as to represent to it selfe an enchancted Palace, or a Chimera; and also when she bends her selfe to consider any thing that is only intelligible, & not imaginabile, for example, to ruminate on ones owne nature: the apprehension she hath of things depends principally on the Will which cautheth her to perceive them. Wherefore it is usuall to consider them as Actions rather than Passions.

The 21 Article.

Of Imaginations caused onely by the body,

Among the apprehensions caused by the body, the greatest part depend on the nerves. But yet there are some that depend not at all on them, which are called Imaginations too, as well as those I lately spoke of, from which nevertheless they differ herein, that our Will hath no hand in framing them, which is the reason wherefore they cannot be numbered among the Actions of the Soul, and they proceed from nothing but this, that the spirits being agitated severall wayes, and meeting the traces of divers impressions preceding them in the brain, they take

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take their course at haphazzard through some certaine pores, rather than others. Such are the illusions of our dreams, and those dotages we often are troubled with waking, when our thought carelessely roames without applying it self to any thing of its own. Now, though some of these imaginations be Passions of the Soul, taking this word in the genuine and peculiar signification; and though they may be all called so if it be taken in a more generall acceptation: yet seing they have not so notorious and determinaed a cause, as those apprehensions which the Soul receives by mediation of the nerves, and that they seem to be onely the shadow, and representation of the others, before we can well distinguiish them, it is necessary to examine the difference between them.

The 22 Article.

Of the difference betwixt them and the other apprehensions.

All the apprehensions which I have not yet explained come to the Soul by mediation of the nerves, and there is this difference between them, that we attribute some of them to the objects from without, that beat upon our senses, some to our body, or some parts of it, and lastly, the rest to our Soul.
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The 25th Article.
Of apprehensions which we attribute to objects without us.

Those which we attribute to things without us, to wit, to the objects of our senses, are caused (at least, if our opinion be not false) by those objects, which exciting some motions in the organs of the exterior senses, by intercourse with the nerves, set up some in the brain which make the soul perceive them. So when we see the light of a torch, and hear the sound of a bell, this sound, and this light, are two several actions, who merely in this regard, that they excite two several motions in some of our nerves, and, by means of them, in the brain, deliver the soul two different sentiments, which we so attribute to those subjects, which we suppose to be their causes, that we think we see the very flame, and hear the bell, not only feel certain motions proceeding from them.

The 24th Article.
Of apprehensions which we attribute to our body.

The apprehensions which we attribute to our body, or any of the parts thereof, are those we have concerning hunger, thirst, and other our natural appetites; wherein may be added pain, heat, and the rest of the affections we feel as in our members, and not in the objects without us. So, we may at the same time, by the intercourse of the same nerves, feel the coldness of our hand, and the heat of the flame it draws near to: or contrarily, the heat of the hand, and the cold of the air where to it is exposed: and yet there is no difference between the actions that make us feel the heat, or the cold in our hand, and those which make us feel that which is without us: unless that one of these actions succeeding the other, we conceive the shift to be already in us, and that which follows, not to be yet in us but in the object that causeth it.

The 25th Article.
Of the apprehensions which we attribute to our Soul.

The apprehensions attributed only to the soul are those whereof the effects are felt as in the soul it selfe, and whereof any other cause, whereunto it may be attributed is commonly unknown. Such are the sentiments of joy, wrath, and the like, which are sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves, and sometimes too by other causes. Now, although all our apprehensions, as well those attributed to objects without us, as those relating to divers affections of our body, be, in truth, Passions in respect of our soul, when this word is taken in the more general signification: yet it is usual
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to restrain it to signifie only those attributed to the Soul it selfe. And they are only these latter which I here undertake to expaline under the notion of Passions of the Soul.

The 26th Article.

That the imaginations, which depend only on the accidentall motion of the spirits, may be as reall Passions; as the apprehensions depending on the nerves.

It is here to be observed that all the same things which the Soul perceives by intercourse with the nerves, may also be represented to it by the accidentall course of the spirits; and no difference between them but this, that the impressions which come from the brain by the nerves, are usually more lively, and manifest than those the spirits excite there, which made me say in the one and twentieth Article, that those are only as the shadow, and representation of those. It is also to be noted, that it sometimes falls out, this picture is so like the thing it represents, that it is possible to be deceived concerning the apprehensions attributed to those objects without us, or those referred to any parts of our body, but not to be served so concerning the Passions, forasmuch as they are so near, and interiour to our Soul that it is impossible she should fee them, unless they were truly such as she doth fee them. So oftentimes when one sleepe, and somet-

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sometimes too being awake, a man fancys things so strongly that he thinks he sees them before him, or feels them in his body, though there be no such thing; but although a man be asleep, and doate, he cannot feel himselfe sad or moved with any other Passion, but it is most true that the Soul hath in it that passion.

The 27th Article.

The definition of the Passions of the Soul.

After we have thus considered wherein the Passions of the Soul differ from all other thoughts, me thinkes they may be generally defined thus. Apprehensions, fenements, or emotions of the Soul, attributed particularly to it, and caused, fomented, and fortified by some motion of the spirits.

The 28th Article.

An explication of the first part of the definition.

They may be called Apprehensions, when this word is used in a generall sense to signifie all thoughts that are not Actions of the Soul, or the wills, but not then when it onely signifieth evident knowledges. For experience shewes us, that those who are most agitated by their Passions, are not such as understand them best, and that they are in the Catalogue of those apprehensions which the strict alliance between the Soul
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The 30th Article.
That the Soul is united to all the parts of the body jointly.

But to understand all these things more perfectly, it is necessary to know, that the Soul is really joined to all the body, but it cannot properly be said to be in any of these parts, but only of the dispositional of the organs, which do all so relate one another, that when any one of them is taken away, it renders the whole body defective: and because it is of a nature that hath no reference to extension, dimensions, or other properties of matter, whereof the body is composed, but only to the whole manner or Contexture of Organs; as appears by this, that you cannot conceive the half or third part of a Soul, nor what space it takes up: and that it becomes not any whit less by cutting off any part of the body, but absolutely withdraws when the Contexture of its organs is dissolved.

The 31st Article.
That there is a little kernal in the brain wherein the Soul exercises her functions more peculiarly than in the other parts.

It is also necessary to know, that although the soul be joined to all the body, yet there is some
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For the opinion of those who think the soul receives her Passions in the heart, it is not worth consideration, for it is grounded upon this, that the Passions make us feel some alteration there; and it is easy to take notice that this alteration is only felt in the heart by the intercouche of a small nerve, descending to it from the brain; just as pain is felt in the feet, by intercouche of the nerves of the foot; and the scarres are perceived.
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wed as to be in the firmament, by the intercourse of their light, and the optick nerves: so that it is no more necessary that our soul exercise her functions immediately in the heart to make her passions be felt there, than it is necessary there should be in the sky to see the stars there.

The 34th Article.

How the Soul and the Body act one against another.

Let us then conceive that the soul holds her principal seat in that little kernel in the midst of the brain, from whence the diffuseth her beams into all the rest of the body by intercourse of the spirits, nerves, yea and the very blood, which participating the impressions of the spirits, may convey them through the arteries into all the members; and remembering what was formerly said concerning this machine our body, to wit, that the little firings of our nerves are distributed into all parts of it, that upon occasion of several motions excited therein by sensible objects, they variously open the pores of the brain, which causeth the animal spirits contained in the cavities thereof, to enter divers ways into the muscles, by which means they can move the members all the several ways they are apt to move, and also that all the other causes which can differently move the spirits, are enough to convey them into several muscles; let us here add, that the little kernel which is the chief seat of the soul hangs to between the cavities which contain these spirits, that it may be moved by them as many several passions as there are sensible diversities in objects; but within, that it may be moved several ways by the soul too, which is of such a nature, that it receives as many various impressions (that is, hath as many several apprehensions) as there come several motions into this kernel. As also on the other side, the machine of the body is so composed, that this kernel being only divers ways moved by the soul, or by any other cause whatsoever, it drives the spirits that environ it towards the pores of the brain, which convey them by the nerves into the muscles, by which means it causeth them to move the members.

The 35th Article.

An example of the manner how the impressions of objects unite in the kernel in the middle of the brain.

As for example; if we see any creature come toward us, the light reflected from his body, paints two images, one in each eye, and these two images beget two others, by intercourse with the optick nerves, in the interior superficies of the brain, that looks towards its concavities; from thence by intercourse of the spirits wherewith these cavities are filled, these
images glance in such a manner on the little kernel, that those spirits encomasse it, and the motion which composes any point of one of those images tends to the same point of the kernel, to which that motion tends that frames the point of the other image, which represents, too, part of this creature: by which means the two images in the brain make up but one single one upon the kernel, which acting immediately against the Soul, shews her the figure of that creature.

The 36 Article.
An example how the Passions are excited in the Soul:

Furthermore, if this figure be very strange, and hideous, that is, if it have much similarity with such things as have formerly been offensive to the body, it excites in the Soul the Passion of fear, afterwards, that of boldness, or else an affright or terror, according to the various temper of the body, or the force of the soul, and according as a man hath formerly protected himself by defence or flight against noxious things whereunto the present impression hath some resemblance; for this renders the brain so disposed in some men, that the spirits reflected from the image so formed on the kernel, go from thence to fall, part into the nerves, which serve to turn the back, and flint the legs to run away, and.

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and part into those which (as is spoken of before) let out or draw up together the orifices of the heart, or which else agitate the rest of the parts from whence the blood is sent, that this blood not being rarified there in the usual manner, sends spirits to the braine that are fitting to maintain, and confirm the passion of fear, that is, such as are proper to hold open, or open again the pores of the brain that convey them into the very same nerves; for the meere entry of these spirits into these pores excites in this kernel a particular motion, instituted by nature to make the soul feel that passion; and because these pores relate principally to the little nerves that serve to lock up or open wide the orifices of the heart, this makes the Soul feel it, as if it were chiefly in the heart.

The 37th Article.
How it appears they are all caused by some motion of the spirits.

And because the like happens in all the other Passions, to wit, that they are principally caused by the spirits contained in the cavities of the brain, seeing they direct their course towards the nerves which serve to enlarge or straiten the orifices of the heart, either to thrust the blood in the other parts differently to it, or whatsoever other way it be, to feed the self same Passion: it may be clearly understood by this; wherefore, I formerly inserted in my definition that
M. des Cartes, on that they are caused by some peculiar motion of the Spirits.

The 38th Article.
An example of the motions of the Body that accompany the Passions, and depend not of the Soul.

Moreover, as the course which these spirits take towards the nerves of the heart is sufficient to give a motion to the kernel, whereby fear is put into the soul: even so, by the mere going of the spirits, at that time into those nerves which serve to stirre the legges to run away, they cause another motion in the same kernel, by means whereof the soul feels and perceives this flight, which may in this manner be excited in the body, by the mere disposition of the organs, the soul not at all contributing to it.

The 39th Article.
How the same cause may excite divers Passions in divers men.

The same impression that the presence of one formidable object workes upon the kernel, and which causeth fear in some men, may in others rouze up courage; and boldnesse: the reason whereof is, that all braines are not alike disposed; for the same motion of the Kernels, which

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which in some excites fear, in others causeth the spirits to enter into the pores of the brain, which convey them, part into the nerves which serve to use the hands for defence, and partly into those which agitate, and drive the blood towards the heart, in that manner as is requisite to produce spirits proper to continue this defence, and retaine a will to it.

The 40th Article.
What the principall effect of the Passions is.

For it must be observed that the principall effect of all the Passions in men is, they incite, and dispose their Souls to will the things for which they prepare their Bodies: so that the resentment of fear incites him to be willing to fly; that of boldnesse, to be willing to fight, and so of the rest.

The 41st Article.
What is the power of the Soul in respect of the Body.

But the will is so free by nature, that it can never be constrained: and of two sorts of thoughts which I have distinguished in the Soul, wherein some are her Actions, to wit her Wills; others, her Passions, taking that word in its generall signification, which comprehends all sorts of apprehensions; the first are absolutely in her
her owne power, and cannot, but indirectly, be changed by the body; as on the contrary, the last depend absolutely upon the Actions which produce them, and they cannot, unless indirectly be changed by the Soul, except then when her selfe is the cause of them. And all the Action of the Soul consists in this, that she freely by willing any thing can make the little kernel, whereunto she is strictly joined, move in the manner requisite to produce the effect relating to this Will.

The 43th Article.

How the things one would remember are found in the memory.

So when the Soul would remember any thing, this Will is the cause that the kernel nodding successively every way, drives the spirits towards several places of the braine, untill they encounter that, where the traces (which were left there) of the object one would remember, are. For these traces are nothing else but the pores of the braine, through which the spirits formerly took their course; by reason of the presence of that object, have thereby acquired a greater facility to be open in the same manner again than the rest can have, by the spirits that come to them; so that these spirits meeting these pores, enter into them easier than the others: whereby, they excite a peculiar motion in the kernel, which presents the same object to the Soul, and makes it know, that is it she would remember.

The 43th Article.

How the Soul can imagine, be attentive, and move the Body.

So when one would imagine any thing one hath never seen, this Will hath the power to make the kernel move in the manner requisite to drive the spirits towards the pores of the braine by the opening of which this thing may be represented. So, when one would fix his attention some pretty while to consider, or ruminate on one object, this Will holds the kernel still at that time, leaning ever to one side. So, in fine, when one would walk, or move his body any way, this Will causes the kernel to drive the spirits towards the muscles which serve to that purpose.

The 44th Article.

That every Will is naturally joined to some motion of the kernel; but that by industry, or habit, it may be annexed to another.

Notwithstanding it is not always the Will to excite in us any motion, or other effect, that can cause us to excite it: but that changes according as nature or habit have differently joined each motion of the kernel to each thought; as for example, if one would dispose his eyes to look
look on an object far distant, this Will causes the ball of them to dilate themselves: and if one would prompt them to behold an object very near, this Will contracts them; but if one thinks only to dilate the ball, he had as good do nothing: that dilates it not at all: because nature hath not joined the motion of the kernel, which serves to drive the spirits to the optic nerve in that manner as is requisite to dilate or contract the ball of the eye: with the will of dilating or contracting it, but with the will of looking on objects remote, or at hand; and then when we speak, we only think the sense of what we would say, yet that makes us move our tongues and lips, much better, and farre readier than if we thought to move them in all the manners requisite to pronounce the same words. Forasmuch as the habit we have acquired in learning to speak, hath taught us to join the action of the Soul, which by the intercource of the kernel can move the tongue, and the lipps, with the significations of the words which follow out of these motions, rather than with the motions themselves.

The 45th Article.

What the power of the Soul is, in respect of her Passions.

Our Passions also cannot be directly excited, or taken away by the action of our Will; but they may indirectly, by the representation of things which use to be joyned with the Passions which we will have, and which are contrary to those we will reject; Thus to excite in ones selfe boldnes and remove fear, it is not enough to have a will to do so, but reasons, objects, and examples are to be consider'd, of, that persuade the dangers are not great: that there is ever more security in defence than flight; that there is glory and joy in vanquishing, whereas there is nothing to be expected but grief and dishonour in flying, and the like.

The 46th Article.

What is the reason that binders the Soul from disposing her Passions totally.

Now, there is a peculiar reason why the Soul cannot suddenly alter or stop her Passions: which gave me occasion to put formerly in their definition, that they are not only caus'd, but formed, and forc'd by some peculiar motion of the spirits: the reason is, they are almost all coupled with some emotion made in the heart, and consequently in all the blood, and spirits too, so that till this emotion cease, they remain present in our thoughts, just as sensible objects are present in them, while they act against the organs of our senses; and as the Soul being very attentive on any other thing, may choose whether she will bear a little noise, or feel a little pain or no, but cannot keep her self from hearing
ing thunder, or feeling fire that burns the hand: so flee may easily overcome the smaller Passions, but not the violentest, and strongest, until after the emotion of the blood and spirits is allayed. The might the Will can doe, while this emotion is in its full strength, is not to consent to its effects, and to restrain divers motions whereunto it disposes the body. For example; if wrath makes me lift up my hand to strike, the Will can usually restrain it; if fear incites my legs to fly, the Will can stop them: and so of the rest.

The 47th Article.

Wherein consist those contentions which use to be imagined between the superior, and inferior part of the Soul.

And it is only in the repugnance of those motions, which the body by its spirits, and the Soul by her Will, endeavor to excite at the same time in the kernel, that all the contentions which use to be imagined between the inferior part of the Soul, called sensitive, and the superior which is reasonable, or else between the natural appetites, and the Will, consist; for there is in us but one Soul only, and this Soul hath no diversity of parts in it; the same which is sensible is rational, and all her appetites are her Will. The error committed in making her act two several parts, which are usually contrary one to another, proceeds meerly hence, that her functions

The Passions of the Soul.

ons have not been distinguished from them of the body, to which only all that can be observed in us repugnant to our reason ought to be attributed; so that there is here no other contention, unless that the little kernel in the middle of the brain, being driven on one side by the soul, and on the other by the animal spirits (which are only bodies, as I laid down before) it happens oftentimes that these two impulstions are contrary, and that the strongest hinders the operation of the other. Now we may distinguish two sorts of motions, excited by the spirits in the kernel: some represent to the soul the objects which move the senses, or the impressions found in the brain, which use not any violence on the Will: others doe use violence to wit, such as cause the Passions, or motions of the body concomitant with them. And for the first though they often-times hinder the action of the soul, or else be hindered by it, yet by reason that they are not directly contrary, there is not any contention observed in them; it is only taken notice of among the last, and the Wills which resift them: for example; between that violence wherewith the spirits drive the kernel to cause in the soul a desire of any thing, and that where- with the Soul beats it back by the will the hath to avoid the same thing, and what chiefly makes this contention appear, is that the Will having not the power to excite the Passions directly (as hath been already said) is constrained to
The Passions of the Soul.

The 48th Article.

Wherein the strength or weakness of souls are known, and what is the misery of the weakest.

Now it is by the success of these contentions that every one may understand the strength or weakness of his soul. For those in whom the Will can most easily conquer the Passions, and stop the motions of the body that come along with them, have without doubt the strongest souls. But there are some who can never try their own strength, because they never let the Will fight with her own weapons, but only with such as are borrowed from some Passions to resist others. Those which I call her own weapons are firm, and determine judgements concerning the knowledge of good and evil, according to which she hath resolved to steer the actions of her life: and the weakest soul of all is such an one whose Will hath not at all determined to follow certain judgements, but suffers it self to be swayed with the present Passions, which being often contrary one to the other, draw it backwards and forwards to either side, and keeping her busie in contending against her self, put the soul into the most miserable estate she can be, as, when fearfulness represents death as an extrem evil, which cannot be shunned but by flight; if, on the other side, ambition represent the infamy of this flight, as a mischief worse than death, these two Passions variety agitate the Will, which obeying now the one, and then the other, continually opposeth its own self, and yields up the soul to slaverie and misfortune.
M. Des Chartes, on

The 49th Article.

That the strength of the soul is not enough without the knowledge of truth.

It is true; there are very few men so wake and resolute, that they will nothing but what their present Passion dictates to them. The most part have determinate judgements according to which they regulate part of their actions. And though oft times these judgements be false, and indeed grounded on some Passions, by which the Will hath formerly suffered her self to be vanquished, or seduced; yet because she perseveres in following them then when the Passion that caused them is absent, they may be considered as her own weapons, and souls may be thought stronger or weaker according as they do more or less follow these judgements, and resist the present Passions contrary to them. But there is a great deal of difference between the resolutions proceeding from some false opinion, and those which are only held up by the knowledge of the truth: since following these last, man is sure never to acquire sorrow or repentance, whereas following the first, they are inseparably companions, after the error is discovered.

The Passions of the Soul.

The 50th Article.

Thus there is no soul so weak, but well managed, may acquire an absolute Mastery over her Passions.

It will be commodious here to know that (as before hath been said) although every motion of the kernel, seem to have been jointed by nature to each of our thoughts, even from the beginning of our life, they may yet be annexed to others by habit, as experience shews in words, that excite motions in the kernel, which according to the institution of nature represent only to the soul their sound, when they are pronounced by the Will, or by the figure of their letters when they are written, and which yet nevertheless, by a habit acquir'd by thinking what they signify, as soon as ever their sound is heard, or their letters seen, use to make us conceive the signification rather than the form of our letters or the sound of their sillables. It is also convenient to know that although the motions, as well of the kernel as the spirits and brain, which represent certain objects to the soul be naturally joined with those that excite certain Passions in her, yet they may by habit be separated, and annexed to others very different; and moreover that this habit may be acquired by one action only, and requires not a long usage: as when...
M. des Cartes, on

as when a man at unawares meets with any na-
fly thing in a dish of meat which he hath a very
good stomack to, this accident may so alter the
disposition of the brain, that a man shall never
afterwards fee any such kind of meat without
loathing, whereas before he took delight in
eating it. The very same thing may be seen in
beasts, for although they have no reason, nor it
may be any thought, all the motions of the spi-
rits and the kernel, which excite Passions in us,
yet are in them, and serve to foment and fortify
(39 or 38 in 38 the Passions, but) the motions of
the nerves, and muscles their concomitants. So
when a dog sees a Partridge, he is naturally en-
clined to run to it, and when he hears a piece go
off, this noise incites him naturally to run away;
yet nevertheless, we ordinarily breed up spani-
els so, that the sight of a Partridge makes them
crouch, and the noise of a discharged piece makes
them run to it. Now these things are profitable
to know, to encourage every one to study the re-
gulation of his Passions. For since with a little
art the motions of the brain in beasts, who are
void of reason, may be altered, it is evident
they may more easily in men, and that even those
who have the weakest Souls, may acquire an absolu-
te Empire over all their Passions, if art, and
industry be used to manage, and govern them.

The Passions of the Soul.

The second part.

Of the number, and order of the Pass-
ions, and explication of the six
chief, or Primitive.

The 51st Article.

What are the first causes of the Passions.

It is knowne by what hath formerly
been said, that the utmost, and nearest
cause of the Passions of the Soul, is
nothing but the agitation, by which
the spirits move the little kernel in the middle
of the braine. But this is not sufficient to disinguish
them from one another: it is necessary, therefore
to seek after their originals, and examine their
first causes. Now, although they may sometimes
be caused by the Action of the Soul, which de-
termines to conceive such or such objects: as al-
so by the meere temper of the body, or by the
impressions accidentally found in the brain, as it
often befalls that a man feels himselfe sad, or
merry, not knowing upon what occasion: it ap-
ppears
M. Des Cartes, on

pears nevertheless by what hath been said, that
the same may be excited also by the objects
which move the senses, and that these objects
are their most ordinary, and principal causes:
whence it follows, that to find them all out, it
is sufficient to consider all the effects of these ob-
jects.

The 52 Article.

What is the use of them, and that they may
be numbered.

Furthermore, I observe, that the objects which
move the senses, excite not divers Passions
in us, by reason of so many diversities in them,
but mostly because they may severally ways hurt
or profit us; or else, in general, be important
to us; and that the use of all the Passions con-
sists only in this, that they dif Roose the Soul
to will the things which Nature dictates are pro-
fitable to us, and to persist in this will; as also the
very agitation of the spirits, accustomed to cause
them, diffuse the body to the motions that fur-
ther the execution of those things. Wherefore to
calculate them, we are only to examine in order,
after how many considerable manners our senses
may be moved by their objects. And I will here
make a general muster of all the principal Pas-
sions according to order, that so they may be
found.

The Passions of the Soul.

The order, and Numeration of the Passions.

The 53 Article.

Admiration.

When the first encounter of any object sur-
prizeth us, and we judge it to be new, or
far different from what we knew before, or from
what we supposed it should have been, we ad-
mire it, and are astonished at it. And because
this may fall out before we know at all whether
this object be convenient or no, I think those admira-
tion is the first of all the Passions. And it
hath no contrary, because if the object presen-
ted, have nothing in it that surprizeth us, we
are not a whit moved at it, and we consider it
without Passions.

The 54 Article.

Estimation, Contempt, Generosity, or Pride,
and Humility, or Dejection.

To Admiration is annexed Estimation or con-
tempt according to the greatness, or small-
ness of the object we admire. So too, we may
either esteem of, or contemne ourselves, from
whence come all the Passions, afterwards, the
habits of Magnanimity, or Pride, and Humility,
or Dejection.
M. des Cartes, on

The 55th Article.
Veneration, and Disdain.

But when we esteem or contemn other objects, which we consider as free causes, capable to doe either good or hurt, from Ellimation comes Veneration, and from meere contempt Disdain.

The 56th Article.
Love, and Hatred.

Now; all the precedent Passions may be excited in us, and we not any way perceive whether the object that causeth them is good or bad. But when a thing is represented to us as good in relation to us, that is, as being convenient for us, this breeds in us love to that: and when it is represented to us as evil or hurtful, this excites hatred in us.

The 57th Article.
Desire.

From the same consideration of good, and evil, arise all the Passions, but to rank them in order, I distinguish of the time, and considering that they encline us more to look after

The Passions of the Soul.

After the future, than the present, or part, I begin with desire. For not onely than when a man desires to acquire a good which he yet hath not, or eschew an evil which he conceives may befall him; but when he desires onely the conservation of a good, or the absence of an evil, which is as far as this Passion can extend itself, it is evident that it always reflects upon the future.

The 58th Article.
Hope, Fear, Jealousie, Security and Despair.

It is sufficient to thinke that the acquisition of a good, or the avoiding an evil is possible, to be incited to desire it: but when a man considers further, whether there be much or small probability that he may obtain what he desires, that which represents much, excites hope in us, and that which represents small, excites fear: whereof Jealousie is one Sort. And when hope is extreme it changes its nature, and is called Security or Assurance; as on the contrary, extreme fear becomes Despair.
The 59th Article.

Irresolution, Courage, Boldness, Cowardice, Affright.

And we may hope, and fear, though the event we expect depends no ways on us: but when it is represented to us as depending on us, there may be a flattering about the election of means, or the execution of them. From the first proceeds Irresolution, which disposes of us to debate, and take counsel. This last, Courage or Boldness opposes, whereas Emulation is one sort. And Cowardice is contrary to Courage, as Scaring, or Affright to Boldness.

The 60th Article.

Remorse.

And if a man were resolved on any Action, before the Irresolution be taken off, that breeds Remorse of conscience: which looks not on the time to come, as the other precedent Passions, but the present, or past.

The Passions of the Soul.

The 61st Article.

Joy, and Sadness.

And the consideration of a present good excites Joy in us, that of an evil, Sadness, when it is a good or an evil, represented as belonging to us.

The 62nd Article.

Derision, Envy, Pity.

But when it is represented to us as belonging to other men, we may either esteem them worthy, or unworthy of them: and we esteem them worthy, that excites in us no other Passion but joy, seeing it is some good to us that we see things fall out as they should doe. There is only this difference in it; the joy which comes from good is serious; whereas that which proceeds from evil is accompanied with laughing and derision. But if we esteem them unworthy of it, the good excites Envy, the bad Pity, which are sorts of Sadness. And it is to be noted that the same Passions which relate to goods or evils present, may also oftentimes relate to that which are to come, forasmuch as the opinion a man hath, that they will come, represents them as present.

D 5
M. Des Cartes, on

The 63rd Article.
Satisfaction of a man’s selfe, and Repentance.

We may also consider the cause of good or evil, as well present as past. And the good which hath been done by us gives us, an inward satisfaction, which is the sweetest of all the Passions; whereas evil excites repentance, which is the bitterest.

The 64th Article.
Good-will, and Gratitude.

But the good which hath beene by others, causeth us to bear Good-will to them, although it were not done to us: and if it be done to us, to Good-will, we adde Gratitude.

The 65th Article.
Indignation, and Wrath.

In the same manner, evil done by others, having no relation to us, breeds only in us Indignation against them: and when it relates to us, it moves wrath also.

The 66th Article.
Glory, and Shame.

Moreover, the good which is, or hath been in us, in reference to the opinion, other men may have of it, excites glory in us: and the evil, shame.

The 67th Article.
Disastre, Sorrow, and Light-heartedness.

And sometimes the contiguity of a good causeth weariness, or Disastre, whereas that of evil allayes Sorrow. Lastly, from good past, proceeds Discontent, which is a sort of Sorrow; and from evil past, Light-heartedness a sort of Joy.

The 68th Article.

Wherefore this Numeration of the Passions, is different from that, commonly receiv’d.

This is the order which seems best to me for reckoning of the Passions. Wherein, I know very well, I digresse from the opinion of all who have written before me: but I doe it not without great cause. For they deduce their Numeration
The Passions of the Soul.

Of Admiration.
The definition, and cause of it.

Admiration is a sudden surprize of the Soul, which caueth in her an inclination to consider with attention the objects which seem rare, and extraordinary to her; it is caused first by an impression in the brain, that represents the object, as rare and consequently, worthy to be seriously considered; after that, by the motion of the spirits, which are disposed by this impression to tend with might and main, towards that place of the brain where it is, to fortify, and conserue it there; as also they are thereby disposed to passe from thence into the muscles, which serve to hold the organs of the senses in the same situation they are, that it may be fomented by them, if it bee by them that it was formed.

The 71 Article.

That there happens no alteration in the heart, nor in the blood in this Passion.

And this Passion hath this peculiar quality; it is observed not to be attended by any alteration
teration in the heart, and the blood, as the other Passions are; the reason whereof is, that having neither good nor evil for its object, but only the knowledge of the thing admired, it hath no relation to the heart, and blood, on which depend all the good of the body, but only with the brain, where dwell the organs of the senses subservient to this knowledge.

The 72th Article.

Wherein consists the power of Admiration.

This doth not hinder it from being exceeding powerful, notwithstanding the surprize, that is, the sudden, and unexpected arrival of the impression that alters the motion of the spirits: which surprize is proper, and peculiar to this Passion: so that it at any time it doth happen to any of the rest, as it usually does to all, and encreaseth them, it is because Admiration is joyned with them; and the power of it consists in two things, viz. the novelty, and for that the motion which it causeth, from the very beginning hath its full strength; for it is certain, such a motive is more operative, then those which being weak at first, and growing but by little, and little, may easily be diverted; also, it is certain that those objects of the senses which are new, touch the brain in certain parts, where it used not to be touched, and that these parts being more

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more tender, or less firme then those that frequent agitation hath harden'd, augments the operation of the motions which they excite there: which will not be deemed incredible, if it be considered, that is the like reason which causeth the soles of our feet, accustomed to a pretty stubborn touch by the weight of the body they bear, but very little to feel this touch when we goe: whereas another far lighter and softer (when they are tickled) is almost insupportable to us, onely because it is is not usual.

The 73th Article.

What Astonishment is.

And this surprize hath so much power, to cause the spirits in the cavities of the brain, to bend their course from thence to the place where the impression of the object admired is, that it sometimes drives them all thither, and finds them such work to conserve this impression, that there are none which passe from thence into the muscles, nor yet so much as deviate any way from the first tracts they followed into the brain: this causes all the body to be unmoveable like a statue, and that one can onely perceive the first represented face of the object, and consequently not acquire any further knowledge of it; it is thus when a man is said to be astonished.
The 74th Article.

For what use the Passions serve, and what they are taught for.

Now, it is easy to gather by what hath formerly been said, that the utility of all the Passions consists only in this; that they fortify, and conserve in the Soul those thoughts which are good for her, and which may else be easily obliterated; as also all the commodity they can cause, consists in this, that they strengthen and maintain those thoughts more than is necessary: or fortify, and conserve others, which ought not to be fixed there.

The 75th Article.

What is the peculiar use of Admiration.

And it may be said peculiarly of Admiration, that it is as beneficial, for causing us to apprehend, and keep in memory things whereof we were formerly ignorant; for we admire nothing but what seems rare, and extraordinary to us: and nothing can seem so to us, but because we were ignorant of it, or else at least because it differs from those things we knew before; for it is this difference that makes it be called extraordinary. Now although a thing unknown to us represent it self newly to our understanding, or our senses, we do not therefore retain it in memory, unless the Idea we have of it be fortified in our brain by some Passion or other, or at least by application of our understanding, which our Will determines to a peculiar attention and reflection. And the rest of the Passions may serve to make us observe things, as they seem either good or evil; but we admire only those which seem rare: we see too, that those who have no natural inclination to this Passion, are commonly very ignorant.

The 76th Article.

Wherein it is hurtful, and how the want of it may be supplied, and the excess corrected.

But it falls out oftener that a man admires too much, and is astonishe, in perceiving things of little or no consideration, than too little, and this may either absolutely take away, or pervert the use of reason. Wherefore although it is good to be born, with some kind of inclination to this Passion, because it disposeth us to the acquisition of Sciences; yet we ought afterwards to endeavour as much as we can to be rid of it. For it is easy to supply
M. des Cartes, on the want of it by a peculiar reflection and attention, whereunto our Will may always oblige our understanding, when we conceive the thing represented is worth the labour. But that is no remedy to cure excessive admiration, but to acquire the knowledge of most things, and to be exercised in the consideration of all such as may seem to be most rare and strange.

The 77th Article.

That they are neither the most stupid, nor the men of greatest parts who are most addicted to admiration.

Furthermore, although none, unless block-headed, and stupid people, but are naturally addicted to Admiration, I do not say, that they who have the most wit, are always most inclined to it, but chiefly those, who although they have a common sense good enough, have no great opinion of their sufficiency.

The Passions of the Soul.

The 78th Article.

That the excess of it may be translated to a habit, for want of correction.

And although this Passion seem to decrease by use because the more a man meets with rare things which he admires, the more he usually ceases to admire them, and thinks those which may be presented to him afterwards but common. Yet when it is excessive, and causeth the attention to be fixed only on the first image of the objects represented, not acquiring any farther knowledge, it leaves behind it a habit, that disposeth the Soul to stop in the same manner, on all other objects which present themselves, provided they appear never so little new. This prolongs the diseas of those who are blindly inquisitive, that is, who seek out rarities only to admire them, and not to understand them, for by little and little they become so full of Admiration, that things of no consequence are as apt to puzzle them, as those whole scrutiny is commodious.
M. Des Chartes, on

The 79th Article.
The definitions of Love and hatred.

Love is an emotion of the Soul, caused by the motion of the spirits, which incite it to join in will to the objects which seem convenient to her, and hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits which incite the soul, to will to be separated from objects represented, to be hurtful to her, I say these emotions are caused by the Spirits to distinguish Love and Hatred which are Passions and depend of the body, as well from the judgements that encline the Soul to join in Will to the things she esteems good, and separate from those she esteems evil, as from the emotions which these judgements alone excite in the Soul.

The 80th Article.

What is meant by joining or separating in Will.

Furthermore, by the word Will, I do not mean here Desire, which is a Passion apart, and relates to the future, that of the consent whereby he at that instant considers himself, as it were, joined to what he loves: so that he imagineth a whole, whereof he thinks himself to be but one part, and the thing beloved another, as on the contrary, in Hatred he considers himself alone as a Whole, absolutely separated from the thing whereunto he hath an aversion.

The 81st Article.

Of the usual distinction between the Love of Concupiscence and Benevolence.

It is frequent to distinguish that there are two sorts of Love, one called Benevolence, that is to say, wishing well to what a man loves: the other Concupiscence, that is to say, which causeth to desire the thing beloved; but I think this distinction belongs to the effects only, and not the essence of Love. For as soon as a man is joined in Will to any object, of what nature soever it be, he hath a wellwishing to it: that is to say, he also thereunto joynes in Will, he things he believes convenient for it, which is one of the main effects of Love. And if he conceive it a good, to possess it, or to be associated with him in any other manner than in Will: he desires it: which is also one of the most ordinary effects of Love.

The
The 82 Article.

How different Passions concur in this that they participate of Love.

Nor is it necessary to distinguish as many sorts of Love, as there are diversities of objects which may be beloved. For example, although the Passions of the ambitious man for glory, the avaricious for money, the drunkard for wine, the behalve for a woman he would violate, the man of honour for his friend, or mistress, and a good father for his children, be in themselves very different, yet, in that they participate of Love, they are alike, but the future first beare a Love merelie for the possession of the objects where unto their Passion relates, and none at all to the objects themselves for which they have onely a desire, mingled with other particular Passions. Whereas the Love a good Father bears to his children is so pure, that he desires to have nothing of them, and would not possess them any otherwise than he does, nor be joined nearer to them than he is already: but considering them as other Selves, he seekes out their good as he would his owne, or rather with more care, because representing to himselfe that he and they make but one whole, whereof he is not the better part, he oftentimes prefers their interests before his own, and fears not his ruin.

The 83th Article.

Of the difference between bare Affection Friendship, and Devotion.

Methinks Love may more justly be distinguished by the esteeme a man makes of what he Loves in comparison of himself. For when he values the object of his Love lesse then himself, he bears only a bare Affection to it: when he rates it equall with himself, it is called friendship; when more, that Passion may be called Devotion. Thus a man may bear an Affection to a fly, a bird, a horse, but unless he have a brain greatly out of tune, he cannot have friendship but for men. And they are so far the object of this Passion that there is no man so defective, but one may bear a perfect friendship to him, if one but thinke ones selfe beloved by him, and that one have a Soul truly noble, and generous: as shall accordingly be explained in the hundred fifty fourth, and hundred fifty six Article. As for Devotion, the principal object thereof is undoubtedly the Soveraigne Divinity, whereunto a man cannot chuse but be devout. If he but understand it as he ought to doe. But a man
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man may carry a Devotion to his Prince too, to his country, to his City, and even to a particular man, when he esteems him much more than himself. Now, the difference betwixt these three sorts of Love, appears chiefly by their effects: for since in all of them a man considers himself as joyed and united to the thing beloved, he is ever ready to abandon the least part of all, which to conserve the other, he attunes therewith. Therefore in bare Affection he always prefers himself before what he loves; &c. contrariwise in Devotion he so much prefers the thing before himself, that he fears not to die for the conservation of it. Whereof we have seen frequent examples, in those who have exposed themselves to a certain death for the defence of their Prince, or their City, and sometimes too, of particular Persons to whom they have been devoted.

The 84th Article.

That there are not so many sorts of Hatred as Love.

Furthermore, although Hate be directly opposite to Love, yet it is not distinguished into so many sorts because a man observeth not so much the difference between the evils a man is separated from in Will, as he does betwixt the goods whereunto he is joyed.

The Passions of the Soul.

The 85 Article.

Of Liking, and Horrour.

And I find only one considerable distinction, alike in each. It consists in this, that the objects as well of Love, as Hatred, may be represented to the Soul by the exterior senses, or else by the interior, and ones own reason. For we commonly call that good or evil, which our interior senses our reason make us judge convenient, or contrary to our nature; but we call that handsome or ugly, which is so represented to us by our exterior senses, chiefly by the sight, which alone is more considered than all the rest. From whence arise two sorts of Love; that which a man beares to good things, and that he bears to handsome things, whereunto we may give the name of Liking, that we may not confound it with the other, nor yet with Desire, whereunto the name of Love is often attributed. And from hence spring, in the same manner, two sorts of Hatred, one whereof relates to things evil, the other to ugly: and this last, for distinction sake, may be called Horrour, or Aversion. But the most observable thing herein, is that these Passions of liking, and Horrour are usually more violent than the other kindes of Love, and Hatred, because that which comes to the Soul by the senses, touches her more to the quick.
quicke, then what is represented by her reason; and yet most commonly they have least truth. So that of all the Passions, these are the greatest cheaters, whom a man ought most carefully to beware of.

The 86th Article.
The Definition of Desire.

The Passion of Desire is an agitation of the Soul caused by the spirits, which dispoles it to Will hereafter the things that she represents unto her selfe convenient. So a man not only desires the presence of an absent good, but the conservation of a present; and moreover, the absence of an evil, as well of that he now endures, as that which he beleives may befall him hereafter.

The 87th Article.
That it is a Passion which hath no Contrary.

I know very well that in the Schools, that Passion which tends to the seeking after good, which onely is called Desire, is opposed to that which tends to the avoiding of evil, which is called Aversion but Seeing there is no good, the privation; whereof is not an evil, nor any evil taken in the notion of a positive thing, the privation whereof is not good; for example, that in seeking after riches, a man necessarily cheues pewetty; in avoiding diseases, he seekes after health; and so of the rest. Me thinks, it is full the same motion which enclines to the seeking after good, and withall, to the avoyding evil, which is contrary to it, I onely observe this difference, that the deire he hath, when he tends towards some good, is accompanied with Love, and afterwards with Hope, and Joy; whereas the same Desire, when he tends to the avoyding an evil contrary to this good, is attended with Hatred, Fear, and Sorrow: which is the reason why it is conceived contrary to it self. But if it be considered when it relates equally at the same time to a good sought after, and an opposite evil to shunne it, it may be clearly perceived but one Passion onely which causeth both the one and the other.

The 88th Article.

What are the several kinds of it.

It were more fit to distinguish Desire into as many severall sorts, as there are severall obects sought after, for example, Curiosity, which is nothing but a Desire to know, differs much from the Desire of glory, and this from the Desire of revenge, and so of the rest. But it is enough here to know, that there are as many sorts of it, as of Love, or Hatred, and that the most considerable and strongest desires, are those which are derived from Liking, and Loathing.

The
The 89th Article.

What is the Desire arising from Horrors.

Now, although it be but one selfe-same Desire which tends to the seeking after good, and avoyding its contrary, evil, as hath been said already; yet the Desire springing from Liking ceases not to be very different from that which ariseth from Horrour; for this Liking and this Horrour, which are in truth, two contraries, are not the good, and the evil which serve for objects to these Desires, but only two emotions of the Soul, which dispose it to seek after two very different things. Horrour is instituted by nature to represent a sudden and unexpected death to the Soul; so that if it be sometimes no more but the touch of a little worme, the noise of a shaking leafe, or one's own shadow that causeth Horrour, a man immediately feel's as great an emotion, as if a most evident danger of death were laid before his eyes; this causeth a sudden agitation, which enclines the Soul to employ all her strength to shun an evil, if present; and it is this kind of Desire which is commonly called flight or Aversion.

The 90th Article.

What is that arising from Liking.

On the contrary, Liking is peculiarly instituted by nature to represent the enjoyment of what is liked, as the greatest good belonging to man: which causeth a man very earnestly to desire this enjoyment; it is true, there are severall sorts of Liking, and the Desires which arise from them are not all alike powerful; for example, the lovelinesse of flowers incite us only to look on them, and that of fruits to eat them: but the chiefe is that which proceeds from the perfections a man imagines in another person, which he thinkes may become another Selfe: for with the distinction of sexes, which nature hath bestowed on man as well as irrational creatures, she hath also put certain impressions in the brain, which makes a man at a certain age, and at a certain season to look on himself as defective, and as if he were but the halfe of a Whole, whereof a person of the other sex ought to bee the other halfe: so that the acquisition of this halfe is represented to us confusedly by nature, as the greatest of all imaginable goods; and although he see many perfors of the other sex, he doth not therefore Desire many at the same time, by reason nature makes him conceive that he hath need of no more but one halfe; but when he observes,
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observes something in any one, that likes him better than any thing he hath marked at the same time in the rest; that fixes the Soul, to feel all the inclination which nature hath given him to seek after the good, that he represents to him as the greatest he can possibly possess on that woman only; and this inclination, or this Desire which is bred thus by liking, is called by the name of Love, more commonly then the Passion of Love formerly described; indeed it hath much more strange effects, and this is he that furnisheth all the Writers of Romances, and Poets with stuffe.

The 91 Article.
The definition of Joy.

Joy is a pleasing emotion of the Soul, wherein consists her enjoyment of good, that the impressions of the brain represent unto her as her own. Nay, in this emotion consists the enjoyment of good: for, in truth the Soul receives no other fruit of all the good shee possesse: and when there is no Joy in her, a man may say shee enjoys it no more then if shee had not any. I also add, it is of that good which the impressions of the brain represent to her as her own, that I may not confound this Joy, which is a Passion, with that Joy purely intellectual, which comes into the Soul by the sole action of the Soul.

The Passions of the Soul.

Soul, and which may be called a pleasing emotion in her, excited by her selfe, wherein consists her enjoyment of good, which her understanding represents to her as her own; it is true, while the Soul is joyned to the body, this intellectual Joy, can hardly be rid of the company of that which is a Passion; for as soon as ever our understanding perceives that we possesse any good, although this good may be so farre different from all that belongs to the body, that it be not imaginable, yet will not the Imagination forbear to make immediately some impression in the brain, whereupon ensue the motion of the spirits which excite the Passion of Joy.

The 92 Article.
The definition of Sadness.

Sadness is a displeasing languishing, wherein consists the discommodity the Soul receives from evil, or defect, which the impressions of the brain represent unto her, as belonging to her; and there is also an intellectual Sadness, which is not the Passion, but which wants but little of being accompanied by it.

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The 93 Article.

What are the causes of these two Passions.

Now, when the intellectual Joy, or Sadness, to excites that which is a Passion, their cause is evident enough; and one may see by their definitions, that Joy comes from the opinion a man hath that he possesses some good, and Sadness from the opinion of some evil, or defect; but it oft falls out, that a man is Sad, or joyful, and yet he cannot distinctly observe the good or evil which are the causes of it: to wit, when this good, or this evil make their impressions in the brain without the intercourse of the Soul, sometimes because they belong only to the body, and sometimes too; although they belong to the Soul, because hee considers them not as good or evil, but under some other notion, the impression whereof is joined in the brain with that of good, and evil.

The 94th Article.

How the Passions are excited by Goods, and evils which only respect the body; and wherein consists tickling, and pain.

So, when a man is in sound health, and the weather is fairer than ordinary, hee feels a lightenss in himselfe, which proceeds not from any function of the understanding, but only from the impressions which the motion of the spirits makes in the brains; and he feels himselfe sad likewise, when his body is indisposed, although he know not that it is. Thus, the tickling of the sences is so closely followed by Joy, and pain by Sadness, that most men cannot distinguish them, yet, they differ so farre, that a man may somtimes suffer pains with Joy, and receive ticklings that displease; but the cause why Joy commonly follows tickling is, because all that is called tickling or a pleasing touch, consists in this, that the objects of the sences excite some motions in the nerves, which would be apt to hurt them if they had not strength enough to resist it, or the body were not well disposed; which makes an impression in the brain, which being infulled by nature, to signify this good disposition, and this strength, represents it to the Soul as a good belonging to her, seeing she is united to the Body, and to excites Joy in her, the cause is almost the same why a man naturally takes delight to feel himself moved to all sorts of Passions, yea, even Sadness, and Hatred, when these Passions are caused only by strange adventures, which hee sees perforated on stage, or by such like occasions, which not being capable to trouble us any way, seem to tickle the Soul by touching it, and the reason why pain usually produces Sadness, is because that feeling which is called pain, proceeds always from some action, so violent that it
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The 95th Article.

How they may also be excited by goods, and evils which the Soul observes not, though they belong to her, as the delight a man takes to run into a danger, or remember an evil past.

So the delight which oft-times young men take to undertake difficult things, and expose themselves to great perils, though they do not so much as look for any profit or honour thereby, comes from hence; the conceit they have that they undertake a difficult thing makes an impression in the brain, which being joyned to that which they may make, if they thought it a good thing to be courageous, fortunate, active or strong enough to dare to hazard so farre, is the reason that they take delight in it, and the content which old men take, when they remember the miseries they suffered, proceeds from hence; they imagine to themselves it is a good thing that they could subsist in spite of them.

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The 96th Article.

What are the motions of the blood, and spirits, that cause the five preceding Passions.

The five Passions which I have here begun to explain are so joyned, or opposed to one another, that it is easier to consider them all together, then to treat distinctly of each, as I handled Admiration: and their cause is not like that, in the braine onely, but also in the Heart, Spleen, Liver, and all other parts of the body, in as much as they serve to the production of the blood, and afterwards of the Spirits. For although all the veins convey the blood they contain, into the heart, yet it sometimes falls out, that the blood of some of them is driven with a stronger force than the rest, and it happens also that the overtures through which it enters into the heart, or those through which it goes out, are more dilated or contracted one time than another.
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The 97th Article.

The principal experiments conducing to the knowledge of these motions, in Love.

Now considering the sundry alterations that experience lets us see in our bodies while our Soul is agitated with divers Passions, I observe in Love when it is alone, that is, when it is not accompanied with any extreme Joy, desire, or Sadness, that the beating of the pulse is even, & much greater and stronger than ordinary; that a man feels a gentle heat in his breast, and quick digestion of meat; so that this Passion is profitable for the health.

The 98 Article.

In Hatred.

On the contrary, I observe in Hatred, that the pulse is uneven, weaker, and oftentimes faster, that a man feels colds intermingled with (I know not what) sharp and pricking heat in the breast that the stomach ceases to do its office, is inclined to vomit, and reject the meats he hath eaten, or at least corrupt them, and convert them into ill humours.

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The 99th Article.

In Joy.

In Joy, that the pulse is even and quicker than ordinary, but not so strong, nor so great as in Love, and that a man feels a pleasant heat, which is not only in the breast, but spreads itself over all the exterior parts of the body, with the blood, which is seen to flow abundantly thicker: and the mean while he sometimes loses his appetite, because the digestion is lesser than usual.

The 100th Article.

In Sadness.

In Sadness, that the pulse is weak and slow, and that a man feels, as it were, fringes about his heart, which bind it close, and icycles that freeze it, and communicate their cold to the rest of the body; yet in the mean while he hath sometimes a good appetite, and feels his stomach not failing of its duty, provided there be no Hatred mingled with the Sadness.
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The 101 Article.

In Desire.

Lastly, I observe this peculiar in Desire, that it agitates the heart more violently than any of the other Passions, and furnishes the brain with more spirits; which passing from thence into the muscles, make all the senses quicker, and all parts of the body more agile.

The 102 Article.

The motion of the blood, and spirits
In Love.

These observations, and many more too long to insert, gave me occasion to conceive, that when the understanding represents to it self any object of Love, the impression which this thought makes in the brain, conveys the animal spirits through the nerves of the sixth pair; to the muscles about the intestines, and the stomach, in the manner requisite to make the juice of meats, which convert into new blood, pass suddenly to the heart, without any demur in the Liver, and which being driven thither with greater force than that which is in the rest of the body, it gets in thither in more abundance, and excites a stronger heat, by reason it is thicker than that which already hath been often rarified by passing and repassing through the heart, which also causeth

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The 103 Article.

In Hatred.

Contrarywise, in Hatred the first thought of the object that breeds aversion so conveys the spirits in the brain to the muscles of the stomach, and intestines, that they hinder the juice of meats, from mixing with the blood, by contracting up all the passages through which it is used to runne, and so conveys it to the small nerves of the spleen and the lower part of the Liver, where the receptacle of choler is, that those parts of the blood which use to be cast out to those places, get out, and runne with that in the branches of the hollow vein, to the heart, which causeth much inequality in the heat of it, seeing the blood that comes from the spleen is not heated nor rarified, but with much difficulty; and on the other side that which comes from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is inflamed and dilated suddenly, by which consequence spirits that go to the brain, have parts very unequall, and motions very unusual: from whence
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whence it comes, that they there fortisfe the Idea of Hatred already imprinted and encline the souls to thoughts full of rancour and bitterness.

The 104th Article.

In Joy.

IN Joy, not onely the nerves of the spleen, Liver, stomack or intestines act, but those in the rest of the body; and particularly that about the Orifices of the heart, which opening and dilating these Orifices, enables the blood which the rest of the nerves have driven from the veins to the heart, to get in there, and issue forth in greater quantity then ordinary: and because the blood which then gets into the heart hath often passed and repassed through it, coming from the arteries into the veins; it easly dilates, and produces spirits, whose parts being very equal, and subtile, are fit to form, and fortisfe the impressions of the brain, which deal lively, and quiet thoughts to the Soul.

The 105th Article.

In Sadness.

Contrariwise, in Sadness the Orifices of the heart are hugely straitened by the small nerve that environs them, and the blood of the veins is no whit agitated: which causeth but very little to go to the heart; and in the mean while the passages through which the juice of meats glides from the stomack, and entrailes to the Liver, are open, wherefore the appetite diminisheth not, unlesse Hatred, which is an ordinary companion of Sadness, close them.

The 106th Article.

In Desire.

Lastly, the Passion of Desire hath the peculiar property, that the Will a man hath to attain any good or avoid any evil, sends the Spirits of the brain immediately to all the parts of the body, that may serve any ways to actions requisite to that purpose; and particularly to the heart, and those parts which supply it with blood most; that receiving it in greater abundance than ordinary, it sends a great number of spirits to the brain, as well to maintain and fortisfe the Idea of this Will, as to passe from thence...
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thence into all the organs of the senses, and all
the muscles which may be set on work, to attain
what one desires.

The 107th Article.
What is the cause of these motions
in Love.

And I deduce the reason of all this, from
what hath formerly been said, that there
is such a yea betwixt our soul and body,
that when we have joyned any corporall Action
with any thought, one of them never pretends
it to be us afterwards, without the other. As
may be seen in such, who with much avertenss,
when they have been sick, have taken some
drink; they can neither eat nor drink afterwards
but they have the same avention; nay further,
they cannot think of their avention to medicines,
but the very same taste comes into their thought.
For, methinks, the first passions our soul admitted
when she was first joyned to our Body, came
from hence, that sometimes the blood; or
some other yuice which got into the heart, was
an alimony more convenient than ordinary, to
maintain heat there, which is the principle of
life: this caused the Soul to joyne in will to this
alimony, that is, to love it: and at the same
time the spirits trickled from the braine into the
muscles, which might press or agitate the parts,
from whence it came to the heart, that they
might

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might send more of it thither: and these parts
were the stomack, and entrailes, whose agita-
tion augments the appetite, or else the liver, and
lungs which the muscles of the Diaphragma may
press. Wherefore the same motion of the spirits
ever since accompanies the passion of Love.

The 108 Article.
In Hatred.

Sometimes, on the contrary, some strange
yuice came to the heart, which was not good
to cherish the heat of it, or which else might ex-
tinguish it: wherefore the spirits which ascended
from the heart to the braine, excited in the
soul the passion of Hatred. And at the same
time also, these spirits went from the braine to
the nerves which might drive the blood from the
spleene, and the small veins of the liver, to the
heart to hinder this noxious yuice from getting
in; and more, to those which might repel this
yuice to the entrailes, and the stomack, or else,
sometimes to make the stomack disgorge it.
From whence it comes, that the same motions
are used to accompany the Passion of Hatred.
And in the liver one may discern by the eye, that
there are in the liver an abundance of veins, or
pipes, indifferent broad, through which the
yuice of meates may passe from the Port-veine
into the hollow-veine, and from thence to the
heart, without stopping any whet at the liver,
but that there are also an infinite number of lesser ones where it may stop, which always contain a reserve of blood, as the spleen doth too; which blood being thicker than that which is in the other parts of the body, may better serve for nutriment to the fire in the heart, when the stomach and entrails lack wherewith all to supply them.

The 109th Article.

In Joy.

IT hath also come to pass at the beginning of our life, that the blood contained in the veins was an alimony sufficiently convenient to maintain the heat of the heart, and they contained so great an abundance of it, that there was no need to exhaust nutriment elsewhere. This hath excited in the soul the passion of joy: and at the same time hath caused the orifices of the heart to be more open than ordinary; and that the spirits trickling abundantly from the brain, not onely into the nerves which serve to open these orifices, but also universally into all the rest which drive the blood of the veins to the heart, hinder any from coming a fresh from the liver, spleen, entrails, and stomach. Wherefore these very same motions accompany joy.

The 110th Article.

In Sadness.

Sometimes, on the contrary, it hath happened that the body hath wanted nutriment, and this hath made the soul feel her first sadness, at least that which hath not been joined with hatred; this very thing hath also caused the orifices of the heart to be contracted, because they received but little blood: and that a good quantity of this blood came from the spleen, by reason that is as the last reserve which serves to supply the heart, when there comes none to it from any where else. Wherefore the same motions of the spirits, and nerves, which so serve to contract the orifices of the heart, and to convey the blood thither from the spleen, always accompany sadness.

The 111th Article.

In Desire.

Allly, all the original desires which the soul might have, when it was newly joined to the body, were, to admit things convenient for her, and to repel hurtful, and it was for the same purpose, that from that instant, the spirits began to move all the muscles, and all the organs
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The 113th Article.

Of the gestures of the eyes, and face.

There is no Passion, but some particular gesture of the eyes declare it: and it is so palpable in some that even the stupidst serving-men by the eye of their matter, observe whether he be angry with them, or not. But though a man may easily perceive these gestures of the eyes, and know what they signify, yet it is not an easy matter to describe them, because every one of them is composed of several alterations, which happen in the motion, and figure of the eye, which are so peculiar, and so small, that each of them cannot be discerned distinctly, though the result of their conjunction be easily marked. The same thing almost may be said of the gestures of the face, which thus accompany the Passions: for though they be greater then those of the eyes, yet it is difficult to distinguish them; & they do little differ, that there are men almost of the same aspect when they weep, as others when they laugh. It is true, there are some very remarkable; as the wrinkling of the forehead in wrath, and certain motions of the nose, and lips in indignation, and derision: but they seem rather to be voluntary then natural. And generally, all these gestures as well of the face as eyes, may be altered by the Soul, when being willing to conceal her Passion.
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M. De Chartes, on Passion, she strongly imagines one contrary to it; so that they may serve as well counterfeit, as declare Passions.

The 114th Article.

Of changing Colour.

A Man cannot so easily refrain from blushing or looking pale, when any Passion disposeth him thereunto: because these changing depend not on the nerves, and muscles, as the former, and because they come more immediately from the heart, which may be called the source of the Passions, seeing it prepares the blood, and spirits to produce them. Now it is certain that the colour of the face comes from nought but the blood, which flowing continually from the heart, through the arteries into all the veins, and from all the veins into the heart, colours the face, more or less; according as it more or less fills the little veins towards the superficies thereof.

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The 115th Article.

How Joy causes blushing.

So Joy renders the colour livelier, and more Vermillion, because by opening the fluxes of the heart, it makes the blood flow quicker in all the veins; and becoming hotter, and more subtile, it moderately raiseth up all parts of the face, which makes the aspect of it more smiling, and brisk.

The 116th Article.

How Sadness makes one look pale.

On the contrary, Sadness, by contracting the Orifices of the heart, makes the blood flow more slowly into the veins, and that becoming colder and thicker, hath not need of so much room: so that retreating into the largest, which are nearest the heart, it defers the remotest: the most apparent whereof being those of the face, that makes it look pale and wan: especially when the Sadness is great, or comes upon one suddenly, as is seen in Affairs, whose surprizals augment the action that obstructs the heart.
The 117th Article.
How a man looks red oft-times when he is Sad.

But it oft-times befalls, that a man does not wax pale when he is Sad, but contrarily becomes red; this ought to be attributed to other Passions joyned to Sadness, to wit, Love, Desire, and sometimes, even Hatred too; for these Passions, heating, or agitating the blood which comes from the liver, entrails, and the rest of the interior parts, drive it to the heart, and from thence through the great Artery to the veins of the face, the Sadness which obstructs the Orifices of the heart on each side not being able to hinder it unless when it is mighty excessive; but when it is only moderate, it easily hinders the blood to come into the veins of the face from descending into the heart, while Love, Desire, or Hatred drive other thither from the interior parts. Wherefore, this blood being settled about the face, makes it look red; and indeed, redder then in Joy, because the colour of the blood appears so much the better, as it flows quicker, and also because more blood can then get up into the veins of the face, than when the Orifices of the heart are more open; This is more palpable in Shame, which is compounded of self-Love, and an earnest Desire to shunne present Infamy: which causeth

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causeth the blood to come from the interior parts to the heart; from thence through the arteries into the face: and withall, of a moderate Sadness, which hinders this blood from returning to the heart. The same is also seen ordinarily when a man weeps: for, as I shall say hereafter, it is Love joyned to Sadness, which, for the most part causes tears; it appears also in Anger, or oft-times an eager Desire of Revenge mixed with Love, Hatred, and Sadness.

The 118th Article.
Of Tremblings.

Tremblings have two several causes: one is, that there come sometimes too few spirits from the brain into the nerves; the other, that there come sometimes too many, so that the little passages of the muscles cannot be duly shut, which as hath been said in the eleventh Article, ought to be shut to determine the motion of the members; the chief cause of it appears to be in Sadness, and fearfulness; as also when a man shaketh with cold; for these Passions, as well as the cold of the air, may so thicken the blood, that it may not furnish the brain with spirits enough, to send any into the nerves; the other cause appears often in those who ardently desire any thing, and in those who are moved with wrath, as also in those who are drunk; for these...
two Passions, as well as Wine, sometimes make so many spirits go into the brain, that they cannot regularly be conveyed from thence into the muscles.

The 19th Article.

Of Languishing.

Languishing is a disposition to ease one's self, and be without motion, which is felt in all the members: it comes, as trembling, because there are not spirits enough in the nerves; but in a different manner: for the cause of trembling is, that there are not enough in the brain, to obey the determinations of the kernel, when that drives them to any muscle: whereas Languishing proceeds from hence, that the kernel doth not determine them to go to some muscles, rather others.

The 20th Article.

How it is caused by Love, and by Desire.

And the Passion which most commonly causeth this effect is Love; joyned to the Desire of a thing, the acquisition whereof is not imagined possible for the present time for love so busies the Soul in considering the object beloved, that it employs all the spirits which are in the brain to represent the image of it to her, and stops all the motions of the kernel not subservient to this purpose. And it is to be noted concerning Desire, that the property which I have attributed to it, of rendering the body more active, agrees not to it, but when a man imagines the object desired to be such, that he may from that very time do some thing which may serve to acquire it. For if, on the other side, he imagines it is impossible for him at that time to doe any thing that may conduce thereunto, all the agitation of Desire remains in the brain, not at all passing into the nerves; and being wholly employed in fortifying the Idea of the object desired there, leaves the rest of the body languishing.

The 21st Article.

That it may also be caused by other Passions.

It is true, that Hatred, Sadness, yes, and Joy too, may cause some kind of Languishing too, when they are very violent: because they wholly busie the Soul in considering their objects chiefly, when the Desire of a thing, to the acquisition whereof a man cannot contribute any thing for the present, is joyned with them. But because hee fixes more on the consideration of the objects which he hath joyned in Will to himself, than those which he hath separated, or any else: and because Languishing depends not
The Passions of the Soul.

The 123 Article.

Wherefore a man doth not swoon with Sadness.

One would think that a great Sadness unexpectedly falling might so shut the Orifices of the heart, that it might extinguish the fire: but yet that is not observed to happen, or if it doe, very rarely: the reason whereof, I believe, is, that there can scarce be so little blood in the heart, but that it is sufficient to maintain the heat, when the Orifices thereof are almost locked up.

The 124th Article.

Of Laughter.

Laughter consists in this, that the blood which comes from the right cavity of the heart, by the arterious vein, blowing up the lungs suddenly, and at severall fits, constrains the aire they contain to break out impetuously through the gullet, where it forms an inarticulate, and clattering sound: and as well the lungs by their blowing, and this aire by breaking forth, move all the muscles of the Diaphragma, breast, and throat: by which means they cause those of the face, which have some connexion with them, to move.
move; and it is only this gesture of the face, with this inarticulate, and clattering voice, that is called Laughter.

The 125th Article.

Wherefore it doth not accompany the greatest joys.

Now, though laughter may seem to be one of the chief signs of Joy, yet this cannot cause that, but only when that is mean, and that there be some little Admiration or Hatred mixed with it; for it is found by experience, that when a man is extraordinary Joyfull, the occasion of this Joy never makes him break out into Laughter: and besides, he can never be so easily invited to it, as when he is Sad; the reason whereof is, that in the greatest Joys the lungs are continually so full of blood, that they cannot be blown up any more by fits.

The 126th Article.

What are the chief causes of it.

And I can mark but two causes, which blow up the lungs thus suddenly; the first is a surprizal of Admiration, which being joyned to Joy may so quickly open the Orifices of the heart, that a great abundance of blood, getting in all together at the right side of it through the hollow veine, is rarified there, and passing from thence through the arterious veine, blows up the lungs; the other is the mixture of some liquor, that augments the rarefaction of the blood; and I find none fit for that purpose, but the wheyest part of that which comes from the Spleen, which part of the blood being driven to the heart, by some light emotion of Hatred, assisted by a surprize of Admiration, and mixing there with the blood which comes from the other parts of the body, which Joy-causes to enter in thither abundantly, may cause this blood to dilate much more than usual; as we see many liquors swell up over the fire, if one sling but a little vinegar into the vessel where they are; for the wheyest part of the blood which comes from the spleene is of a nature like vinegar. Experience also shews us, that in all encounters producing this loud Laughter which comes from the lungs, there is still some little occasion of Hatred, or at least of Admiration; and those whose spleens are not found, are subject not only to be more sad but by intervalls more merry, and disposed to laughter then others; for as much as the spleene tends two sorts of blood to the heart, one, thick and gross, which causeth Sadness, the other, exceeding fluid and subtile, which causeth Joy. And oft-times, after much Laughter a man feels himselfe naturally inclined to sadnesse, because the most fluid part of the blood of the spleene being exhausted, the grosser followes it to the heart.

F. 5.
The 27 Article.

What is the cause thereof in Indignation.

For that kind of Laughter which sometimes accompanies Indignation, it is usually artificial, and feigned. But when it is natural, it seems to come from the Joy a man hath, to see he cannot be hurt by the evil whereat he is offended, and with that he finds himself surprized by the novelty, or the unexpected encounter of this evil. So that Joy, Hatred, and Admiration contribute to it. Yet I will suppose that it may be produced without any Joy, by the mere motion of Aversion, which tends the blood from the Spleen to the heart, where it is rarified, and thence into the Lungs, which it easily blows up when it finds them empty. And generally, whatsoever suddenly blows up the lungs in this manner, causeth the exterior action of Laughter: except when Sadness alters it into groanes, and shrikes, that accompany tears. Vives 3 de Anima, cap. de Risu. Writes of himselfe (which is very pertinent to this) that when he had been a long time fasting, the first bits he put in his mouth made him laugh: which might come from hence; his lungs empty of blood for want of nutriment, was suddenly blowne up by the first juyce that passed from his Stomack to his heart: or

The 28, Article.

Of the Originall of Tares.

As Laughter is never caused by the greatest Joyes, so Tears proceed not from an extrem Sadness, but an indifferent one, and that accompanied with, or followed by some resentiment of Love, or also of Joy. And to understand their originall well, it must be noted, that although abundance of vapours continually issue forth from all parts of our Body, yet there is none from whence there come so much as from the eyes, by reason of the greatness of the opticke nerves, and the multitude of little arteries through which they come: and that as sweat is made of the vapours, which issuing out of the other parts convert into water on the superficies of them, so tears are made of vapours issuing from the eyes.
The 129. Article.

Of the manner how vapours turn into water.

Now as I have written in the Meteors, explaining after what manner the vapours of the aire convert into rain, that is proceeds from their being lesse agitated, or more abundant than ordinary: so, I believe, that when those that issue from the Body are faire lesse agitated than usuall, although they are not so abundant, yet they may convert to water: which causeth the cold sweats, that sometimes proceed of weakness, when a man is sick. And I believe that when they are more abundant, provided they be not withall more agitated, they also convert into water, this causeth sweat when one useth exercise. But then the eyes sweat not, because while the Body is exercised, the greatest parts of the spirits going into the muscles which serve to move it, there go lesse through the optic nerve to the eyes. And it is but the same matter which compound the blood in the veins, or arteries; and the spirits, when it is in the brain, nerves, or muscle; and vapours when it issues out in the likeness of aire. And lastly, sweat, tears, when it thickens into water on the superficies of the Body or the eyes.

The 130. Article.

How that which hurts the eye, excites it to weep.

And I can see but two causes that make the vapours issuing from the eyes to change into tears. The first is, when the figure of the pores, through which they passe, is changed by any accident whatsoever; for that, regarding the motion of these vapours, and altering their order, may cause them to convert into water. So, there needs only a straw in the eye, to draw out some tears: by reason that exciting paine in it, it alters the disposition of the pores; so that some becoming more narrow, the small parts of the vapours passe lesse quickly through it; and whereas formerly they issued out equally distant the one from the other, and so were separated. They come to meet because the order of these pores is molested, by which means they joyn together, and so convert into tears.

The 131. Article.

How one weepes for Sadnesse.

The other cause is Sadnesse, followed by Love, or Joy, or generally by any cause, which makes the heart thirst much blood into the arteries.
M. Des Cartes, on

ries. Sadness is requisite thereunto because making the blood cold, it contracts the pores of the eyes. But because, according as it contracts them, it also decreases the quantity of vapours, whereunto they should allow passage, that is not yet sufficient to produce tears, unless the quantity of vapours be at the same time augmented by some other cause. And there is nothing that encreaseth it more, then the blood sent from the heart in the Passion of Love. We see also, that they who are sad, do not continually shed tears, but only by intervals, when they make any new reflexion on the objects they affect.

The 132. Article.

Of the groans which accompany tears.

And then sometimes the lungs are blown up all at once by the abundance of blood which gets into them, and drives away the air they contained, which breaking forth through the gullet, begets groans and cries which usually accompany tears. And these cries are commonly more sharp than those which accompany Laughter, though they be produced almost in the same manner: the reason whereof is, that the nerves which serve to enlarge or contract the organs of the voice to make it stronger or sharper, being joyned to those which open the Orifices

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Orifices of the heart in Joy, and contract them in Sadness, cause these organs to be dilated or contracted at the same time.

The 133. Article.

Wherefore children, and old men are aptest to Weep.

Children, and old men are apter to Weep, than they of a middle age, but for several reasons. Old men Weep oft-times out of affection, and for Joy: for these two Passions joyned together, send much blood to the heart, and from thence many vapours to the eyes: and the agitation of these vapours is so retarded by their natural coldness, that they are apt to convert into tears although no sadness preceded. But if some old men are apt to Weep for vexation too, it is not so much the temper of their Body, as that of their mind, which disposes them the unto. And this befalls only those who are too weak, that they suffer themselves to be absolutely overcome by small occasions of grief; fear, or pity; the same happens to children, who do not Weep commonly for Joy, but rather for sadness, that unaccompanied with Love. For they ever have blood enough to produce many vapours, the motion of which being retarded by sadness, they convert into Tears.
The 134. Article.

Wherefore some children wax pale, instead of Weeping.

Yet there are some, who wax pale, instead of Weeping, when they are vexed: which may denote an extraordinary judgement, and courage in them: that is, when it proceeds from the consideration of the greatness of the evil, they prepare themselves for a strong resistance, as they do, who are elder. But it is ordinarily a mark of an ill nature; that is, when it proceeds from their inclination to Hatred, or Fear follow: for they are Passions that diminish the matter of tears. And on the contrary, it is seen that those who are prone to Weep, are inclined to Love, and Pity.

The 135. Article.

Of Sigles.

The cause of Sigles is very different from that of tears, though it, like them, presupposes Sadness. For whereas a man is excited to Weep, when the lungs are full of blood; he is incited to sigh when they are almost empty, and when some imagination of Hope, or joy opens the Orifice of the venous artery which Sadness had contracted; because then the final remainder of blood in the lungs, falling all together into the left side of the heart through this venous artery, and driven on by a Desire to attain this Joy, which at the same time agitates all the muscles of the Diaphragm and breast, the air is suddenly blown through the mouth into the lungs, to fill up the vacant place of the blood. And this is called Sighing.

The 136. Article.

From whence proceed the Passions which are peculiar to certain men.

Furthermore, that I may here in few words supply all that may be added hereunto concerning the several effects, or causes of the Passions, I am content to repeat the principle, whereon all that I have written of them is grounded: to wit, that there is such a tie betwixt our Soul, and Body, that when we once have joyned any corporal Action with any thought, one of them never presents itself to us without the other: and that they are not always the same Actions which are joyned to the same thoughts. For this is sufficient to give a reason of all that any man can observe peculiar, either in himself, or others, concerning this matter, which hath not been here explained. And for example, it is easy to conceive that the strange Aversions of Some, who cannot endure the smell of roses, the sight of a Cat, or the like, come only from hence; that when they were but newly alive they were displeased with some
some such like objects, or else had a fellow-feeling of their mothers resentment, who was so distasteful when she was with child; for it is certain, there is an affinity between the motions of the mother, and the child in her womb, so that whatsoever is displeasing to one, offends the other; and the smell of Roses may have caused some great head-ach in the child, when it was in the cradle; or a Cat may have affrighted it, and none took notice of it, nor the Child so much as remembered it: though the Idea of that Aversion he then had to Roses, or a Cat, remain imprinted in his brain to his lives end.

The 37th Article.

Of the use of the five precedent Passions, as they relate to the body.

Now the definitions of Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and Sadness are laid down; and the corporall motions that cause them or accompany them treated of, we have no further to doe, but consider the use of them. Concerning which, it is to be observed, that according to the institution of Nature; they all relate to the body, and are not given to the Soul, but as joyned to it: so that their natural use is to incite the Soul to consent and contribute to the actions, which may be useful to conserve the body, or make it in some kind more perfect; and in this sense Sadness,
M. Des Charnes, on

them, and whereunto they incite our Soul to consent yet it is not always good, seeing there are many things hurtful to the body, which at first cause not any Sadness, nor yet conferre Joy: and others beneficial to it, though at first they be incommmodious. And besides, they most commonly make the evills, and goods they represent to us, seem much greater, and weightier than they are; so that they incite us to seek after the one, and avoid the other with more vehement and anxiety then is convenient; as we see bees are often entrapped by baits, and to shun little evills they precipitate themselves into greater. Wherefore, we ought to make use of our experience, and reason to distinguish good from evil, and know their just value, that we may not take one for the other, nor addict our selves to any thing excressively.

The 39th Article.

Of the use of the same Passions, as they relate to the Soul, and first of Love.

This were sufficient, if wee had only a body, or if that were our better part; but seeing it is the least, we ought chiefly to consider the Passions as they relate to the Soul in respect whereof Love, and Hatred proceed from Knowledge, and precede Joy, and Sadness: except when these two last hold the place of Knowledge, whereof those are sorts; and when this knowledge is true, that is, when the things it inclines us to love, are truly good, and those it inclines us to hate are truly evil, then Love is incomparably better then Hatred; nor can it be too great, or fail to produce joy, I say, this Love is extraordinary good; because joying true goods to us, it makes us so much the more perfect. I say also, that it cannot be too great; for, what the most excrosse can do, is but to joyne us so absolutely to those goods, that we put distinction between the love we bear to that, and our selves; which I believe, cannot be evil. And it is necessarily followed by Joy; because it represents what we love, as a good belonging to us.

The 40th, Article.

Of Hatred.

Hatred, on the contrary, cannot be so small but it hurts, and it is never without Sadness. I say it cannot be too small, because we are not incited by Hatred to any Action, but what we may be by Love of the good contrary to it; at least, when this good, and evil are enough understood. For I confess, that the Hatred of evil which is not manifested but by pain, is necessary in respect of the Body; but I speak here of that which proceeds from a more cleare knowledge; and I attribute it only to the Soul. I say also, that it is never without Sadness; because evil being but a privati-
on, it cannot be conceived without some real subject wherein it is, and there is nothing real, but hath some goodness in it; so that the Hatred which make us refrain from evil, doth also make us refrain from the good whereunto it is annexed; and the privation of this good, being represent'd to our Soul, as a defect in her, excites Sadness. For example, the Hatred which makes us refrain from the evil manners of any one, doth by the same means, make us refrain from his conversation, wherein we might otherwise finde some good, which we are vexed to be deprived of. And so in all other kinds of Hatred, some subject of Sadness may be observ'd.

The 142 Article.

Of Desire, Joy, and Sadness.

For desire, it is evident, that when it proceeds from a true knowledge, it cannot be evil, provided it be not immoderate, and that this knowledge regulate it. It is evident also, that Joy cannot chuse but be good, nor Sadness, but be evil, in respect of the Soul: because in the last consist all the inconveniences that the Soul receives by evil, and in the first all the enjoyment of good belonging to her. So that, if we had no Bodies, I durst say, we could not give our selves up too much to Love, and Joy, nor too much shunne Hatred, and Sadness. But the cor-

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...oral motions that accompany them, may be hurtful to the health, when they are very violent, and on the other side usefull when they are but moderate.

Furthermore, since Hatred and Sadness ought to be rejected by the Soul, even then when they proceed from a true knowledge, much more ought they to be, when they come from any false opinion; but it may be doubted whether Love, and Joy, are good or no, when they likewise are ill grounded; and me thinks, if it be only considered what they are precisely in themselves, in respect of the Soul, it may be said that, although the Joy be less solid, and the Love lesse advantageous, then when they have a better foundation, they are at the worst to be preferred before Sadness, and Hatred as ill grounded, so that in the occurrences of life, where we cannot avoid the hazard of being deceived, wee doe always best to lean to those Passions which tend towards good, then those which have relation to evil, although it be to shun it: Nay, sometimes a false Joy is better then a Sadness from a true cause; but I dare not say the same of Love, in relation to Hatred: For when Hatred is just, 

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The 143 Article.

Of the same Passions, as they relate to 'Desire'.

And it must be exactly noted, that what I now spake of these foure Passions, takes place only when they are considered precisely in themselves, and encline us not to any action; for seeing they excite Desire in us, by whose interposition they regulate our manners, it is certain that all those that come from a wrong cause may hurt, and on the other side, those that come of a just cause may be useful; and further, that when they are both equally ill grounded, Joy is commonly more hurtful then Sadness, because this enduing a man with referrednesse, and Warinesse, doth in some sort encline him to Prudence, whereas the other render those who give themselves up thereunto inconsiderate, and rash.

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The 144th Article.

Of Desires whose events depend only on our selves.

But because these Passions cannot sway us to any actions, but by the interposition of the Desire that they excite, it is Desire which we ought peculiarly to regulate, and therein consists the principal part of Morality. Now, as I said just now, it is always good when it follows a true knowledge, so it cannot chuse but be bad when it is grounded on an error; and I think, the most ordinary error committed in Desire, is when a man doth not clearly enough distinguish the things which absolutely depend on our selves, from those which do not.

For concerning those which depend of us, that is of our free disposition, it is enough to know that they are good, not to desire them with too much vehemence; because it is a following of Vertue, to doe the good things that depend of us; and it is certain, he cannot have too ardent a Desire after Vertue. Besides, what we thus desire cannot chuse but be accomplished; since it depending only on us, we ever receive the plenary satisfaction we expect, but the usual fault herein is, not that we desire too much, but too little; and the sovereign remedy against that is, as much as in us lies, to ride the spirit of all kind...
of Desires, and if useful, then to strive to know clearly, and consider with attention, the goodness of that which is to be desired.

The 145th Article.

Of those which depend upon other causes; and what Fortune is.

For those things which depend not every way of us, how good soever they be, they ought never to be desired with Passion: not only because they may not befall, and by this means afflict us so much the more, by how much more they were desired: but chiefly, because when they possess our thoughts, they divert us from bending our affection to other things, the acquisition whereof depends of our selves; and there are two general remedies against these idle Desires; the first, generosity, which I will speak of hereafter; the second, is, that we ought to reflect on divine Providence, and imagine to our selves that it is impossible that anything happen otherwise than this Providence hath determined from all eternity; so that there is a kind of fatality, or unrefrangible necessity to oppose Fortune to destroy her, as a Chimera proceeding only from the error of our understandings, for we can desire nothing but what we think in some manner possible; and we cannot suppose things which depend not of as possible, seeing we think they depend not on Fortune: that is, we suppose, they may happen, and the like hath happened formerly. Now, this opinion is only grounded upon this, that we not understanding, all the causes, contributive to every effect; for when a thing which we supposed to depend on Fortune doth not fall out, that shews some of the causes necessary to produce was wanting: and consequently that it was absolutely impossible and that the like did never happen, that is, where a like cause of its Production was wanting: so that had we not been ignorant of that before, we should never have imagined them possible, nor consequently should ever have desired them.

The 146th Article.

Of those that depend of us, and others too.

This vulgar opinion then, that there is without us a Fortune which causeth things to fall out, or not to fall out, according to her pleasure, must be utterly rejected; and it must be understood that all things are guided by a divine Providence, whose eternall decree is infallible and immutablc, that unless those things which the same decree hath pleased, to let depend on our free disposition, we ought to think, for our parts, that nothing happens but what of necessity must
must, as it were fatal, so that without a crime, we cannot desire it may happen otherwise. But because the most part of our Desires extend to two things which depend not altogether on our selves; nor altogether else-where, we ought exactly to distinguish, what in them depends on our selves, that we may not let our Desire ramble any farther than that; and for what is over and above, though we should esteem the success thereof absolutely fatal, and immutable, that our Desire beseit not it itself thereabout, we should not omit to consider the reasons why it ought less or more to be hoped for, that they may serve to regulate our actions. For if for example, we had any business at a place whether we might goe two several wayes, one whereof useth to be much safer than the other, although the decree of Providence be such, that if we go that way which is conceived fairest, we shall not escape robbing; and on the contrary, we might have gone the other way without any danger, yet we ought not therefore to be indifferent which we take; nor rest upon the immutable fatality of this decree; But reason wills us to choose the way which useth to be fairest: and our Desire here-fore ought to be fulfilled, whatsoever evil befal us by following it: because this evil (or milchief) having been, as to us, inevitable, we have no occasion to wish to be exempted from it, but only doe the best our understanding can comprehend, as, I suppose, we have done; and it is certain

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mine that when a man exerciseth himselfe so, to distinguish betwixt Fatallity, and Fortune, he easilie habituates himselfe so to regulate his Desires, that seeing the fulfilling of them depends only on our selves, they may always give us an absolute satisfaction.

The 147th Article.

Of the interior motions of the Soul.

I will onely addde here one consideration; which mee thinks is very usefull, to hinder us from receiving any discommodity by our Passions; it is, that our good, and will depends chiefly of interior motions, excited in the Soul onely by the Soul her selfe: wherein they differ from these Passions, which ever depend of some motion of the spirits. And although these motions of the Soul be often joyned to the Passions resembling them, they may also be often found among other Passions, and even spring from those that are contrary to them. For example, when a husband weeps for his deceased wife, whom (as oft it falls out) it would vex him to see restored to life againe: it may be, his heart is straightned by Sadsnesse, which the solemnity of the funeral, and the absence of a person, whose conversation he was used to, excite in him; and, it may be, some remaints of Love, or Pity, which present themselves to his imagination.
nation, draw true tears from his eyes, notwithstanding that in the mean time he feels a secret joy in the most interior part of his Soul; where emotion is so strong, that the Sadness, and tears accompanying it, cannot diminish any of its force. And when we read strange adventures in a book, or see them personated on a stage, it sometimes excites Sadness in us, sometimes Joy, or Love, or Hatred, and generally all the Passions, according to the diversity of objects, that offer themselves to our imagination; but withall we take a delight, to feel them excited in us, and this delight is an intellectual Joy, which may as well spring from Sadness, as all the rest of the Passions.

The 148 Article.

That the exercise of Virtue, is a Souveraine remedy against the Passions.

Now, forasmuch as these interior emotions doe touch us nearest to the quick, and consequently have more power over us, then the Passions they differ from, which are met withall in them, it is certain, that provided our Soul have wherewithall to content her interior part, all the troubles, that come from abroad, are not able to hurt her, but rather serve to augment her Joy; in that, seeing she cannot be injured by them, they let her understand her own perfection. And that our Soul may be thus contented, she need do nothing but exactly follow the track of Virtue. For whosoever hath lived so, that his Conscience cannot hit him in the teeth for failing to doe all things which he judged to be best (which is the thing I mean here by following the track of Virtue) he from thence receives a satisfaction so effectual to make him happy, that the most violent assaults of the Passions, shall never be strong enough to trouble the tranquility of his Soul.
Now the six Original Passions are explained which are as the kinds (or Genra) whereof all the rest are but sorts (or Species). I will here succinctly observe what there is peculiar in every one of the rest; and I will keep still the same order wherein I have formerly marshalled them. The two first are Estimation and Contempt. For though they commonly signify only the opinions a man hath without any Passion, of the value of any thing; yet because from these opinions doth often spring Passions which want peculiar names, I think, these may be attributed to them. And Estimation, as it is a Passion, is an inclination of the Soul, to represent unto her selfe the value of the thing.
thing esteemed, which inclination is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, so conveyed into the braine, that they there fortisfe the impressions belonging to that purpose. As, on the contrary, the Passion of contempt is an inclination of the Soul to consider the meanesse or smallness of what it contemnnes, caused by the motion of the spirits, which fortisfe the Idea of this smallness.

The 150 Article.

That these two Passions are but Sorts of Admiration.

So both these Passions, are but sorts of Admiration. For when we neither admire the greatness, nor smallnesse of an object, we make neither more, nor lesse account of it than reason dictates to us: we ought to doe: so that we then esteem, or contemne it without Passion. And though oft-times Eftimation be excited in us by Love, and Contempt by Hatred, that is not so always, and proceeds only from this; that a man is more or lesse inclined to consider the greatness or smallnesse of an object, as he hath more or lesse affection to it.

The 151 Article.

That a man may esteem, or contemne himself.

Now these two Passions may generally relate to all sorts of objects; but they are especially remarkable, when we referre them to our selves, that is, when it is our own merit that we either esteem, or contemne, and the motion of the spirit which causeth them, is then to manifest, that it even changes the countenance, gesture, gait, and generally all the actions of those, who conceive a better, or worse opinion of themselves than ordinary.

The 152 Article.

For what cause a man may esteem himself.

And because one of the chiefe parts of Wisedome is to know in what manner & for what caufe every one ought to esteem, or contemne himself, I will here endeavour to give my opinion thereof. I obferve but one thing in us which may give us just caufe to esteem our selves, to wit, the rule of our free Disposition, and our empire over our Wills. For, only the actions depending on this free Disposition, are those for which we may
may justly be praised or blamed: and it makes us in some manner like unto God, by making us masters of our selves, provided wee doe nor lose the priviledges it gives us, by our unworthines.

The 153 Article.

Wherein Generosity consists.

So I believe, true Generosity, which causeth a man to set himself at the highest rate he justly may; consists only, partly, in knowing there is nothing which truly he can call his own, unless this free Disposition of his Wills, nor wherefore he ought to be praised or blamed, unless for using that well or ill; and partly in feeling a constant, and firme resolution in himselfe to use it well, that is, his Will shall never be wanting to undertake, and execute such things as hee shall judge to be best, which is, to follow Virtue absolutely.

The 154th Article.

That it restrains a man from contemning others.

Those who have this knowledge, and recollection of themselves, are easily perswaded that every other man hath such of himselfe too, because there is nothing in it that depends of any thing else. Wherefore they never contemne any body: and though they oftentimes see other men commit errors, that make their weakness appeare, yet they are evermore inclined to excuse than blame them, and to believe that they doe it rather for want of knowledge, than good will. And as they doe not think themselves much inferior to those who have greater estates, honours, nor yet more wit, knowledge, beauty, or generally that surpasse them in any other perfection; so they do not esteem themselves, much above those whom they surpasse, because all these things seem very little considerable to them, in comparison of their good Will, for which only they esteem themselves, and which, they supprize, is, or at least may be in every other man.

The 155th Article.

Wherein vertuous Humilitie consists.

So the most generous use to be most humble, and vertuous Humilitie consists only in this, that the reflexion we make on the infirmity of our own nature, and the faults we may have formerly committed, or those we are like to commit, which are no whit lesse than those committed by others, is the reason why we do not presume our selves before any body, but think that others, who have their free Disposition as well as we, may use it as well.
The 156th Article.

What are the properties of Generosity are; and how it serves for a remedy against all meannesses of the Passions.

They who are generous, are naturally addicted to do great things, and yet to undertake nothing they are not capable of; and because they esteem nothing greater than to do good to other men, and to contain their own interest on such an occasion, they are exquisitely courteous, affable, and officious to every one. Withall, they are absolutely masters of their Passions: especially of their Desires, Jealousy, and Envy, because there is nothing, the acquisition whereof depends not on them, whose worth they suppose can counterbalance a hearty Desire of them: and of Hatred against men, because they esteem them all; and of Fear, because the confidence of their own vertue secures them; and lastly, of Wrath, because little valuing all things without themselves they never give their enemies so much advantage, as to acknowledge that they are angry with them.

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The 157th Article.

Of Pride.

All such as have a good conceit of themselves for anything else whatsoever, have not a reall Generosity, but only Pride, which is always very vicious, though it be so much the more, as the cause for which a man esteems himself is more unjust: and the most unjust of all, is, when he is proud for no reason that is, though no man can see (for all this,) any desert in him for which he should be prized: but only, because worth is trampled on, and he imagines Renown is nothing but mere usurpation, he believes that they who attribute most to themselves, have most. This vice is so unreasonable, and absurd, that I should scarce believe there were any such men, who gave themselves up thereto, if nobody had ever been praised unjustly: but flattery is so common every where, that there is no man so deficient, but hee oft feareth himself esteemed for things which merit not any praise, yea, that even deserve blame, which gives occasion to the more ignorant and stupid to fall into this sort of Pride.
The 158 Article.

That the effects thereof are contrary to those of Generosity.

But whatsoever be the cause for which a man esteems himself, if it be ought else but the Will he perceives in himself, always to use well his free Disposition, from whence I said Generosity came, it ever produces a Pride exceeding blame-worthy, and so different from this true Generosity, that the effects whereof are absolutely contrary. For all other goods, as wit, beauty, riches, honours, &c. U sing to be the more esteemed, for being found in fewer persons, and being for the most part of such a nature, that they cannot be communicated to many, therefore proud men endeavour to abase all other men, and being flaves to their desires, their souls are incessantly agitated with Hatred, Envy, Jealousie, or Wrath.

The 159 Article.

Of Dejection.

For Dejection, or vicious Humility, it consists chiefly in this, that a man perceives himself weak, or little resolute, and, as if he had not the absolute use of his free disposition, he cannot refrain from doing things, whereof he knows not whether he shall repent or no afterwards: then besides, that he believes he cannot submit of himself, nor forgoe many things, whose acquisition depends from without him. So it is directly opposite to Generosity, and it oft befalls that men of a meaner spirit, are most arrogant and proud, just as the most generous are most modest, and humble. But whereas those of a generous spirit alter not their nature by any prosperity or adversity that befalls them, these who are weak, and abject are onely guided by fortune, and prosperity doth not raise them up so high, but adversity brings them down as low. Yea, it is often seen that they abase themselves shamefully to such as they expect profit or fear evil from, and at the same time lift themselves up insolently over those from whom they neither hope, nor fear any thing.

The 160th Article.

What the motions of the spirits, in these Passions, is.

Moreover, it is easy to understand that Pride, and dejection are not onely vices but Passions, because their emotion is very palpable exteriously in those who are suddenly raised up or brought down by any new occasion. But it may be doubted whether Gene-
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vice proceeds commonly from ignorance, so that
they who least understand themselves are apt to
grow more proud, or become more abject
than they ought to be, because every new
thing that befalls them surprizeth them,
and causeth them, that attributing it to themselves,
they admire and esteeme or confesse them-
selves, as they judge that which is befallen them
advantageous to them, or not. But because as
soon as one thing hath estated them, comes an-
other that dejects them, the motion of their Pas-
sion is various. Contrarily, there is nothing in
Generositie, incompatible with vertuous Humili-
ity, nor any thing extraneous that can alter it:
wherefore the motions thereof are firme, con-
stant, and ever like themselves. But they proceed
not so much from surprize, because they who
in this manner esteem themselves, do very well
understand the reasons why they do esteem them-
selves. Yet it may be said that these causes are
so wonderfull (to wit, the power of their free
Disposition, which makes them prize them-
themselves and the infirmities of the subject in
which this power is, which makes them not to
value themselves too high,) that as often as
they are presented new, they still cause new Ad-
miration.

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The ambitious are; a man may by exciting the Passion in himselfe, acquire the vertue of Generosity, which being as the key of all the other vertues, and a generall remedy against all the irregularities of Passions, me thinks, this consideration ought to be very seriously noted.

The 162. Article.

Of Veneration.

Veneration, or respect is an inclination of the Soul not only to esteeme the object it reverenceth, but also to submit to it with some kind of fear, to endeavour to make it become gracious to her. So that we bear only a Veneration to free causes, which we conceive able to do good or evil to us, without knowing which of the two they will doe. For we bear Love, and Devotion rather than a meer Veneration to those from whom we onely expect good, and we bear Hatred to none but such as we only expect evil from; and if we conceive the cause of this good, or evil not to be free, we do not submit our selves thereunto to get the goodwill of it. So when the Pagans bore a Veneration to woods, springs, mountains, they did not properly reverence these inanimate things, but the Divinities which they thought presided over them. And the motion of the spirits that excite this Passion is compounded of that which excites admiration and that which excites Fear, whereof I will speak hereafter.
The 163 Article.

Of Disdain.

Just so, that which I call disdain is an inclination of the Soul to contente a free cause, by judging that though of its own nature it be able to doe either good or evill, yet it is so far beneath us, that it can doe us neither; and the motion of the spirits that excite it, is compounded of those that excite Admiration, and Security, or Boldneffe.

The 164th Article.

Of the use of these two Passions.

And it is either Generosity, or Deification and weakness of spirit, that determine the good or ill use of these two Passions; for by how much a man's Soul is more noble or generous, so much the more inclination he hath to give every one his own: and do hath not only an extraordinary Humility towards God, but without reluctancy bestowes all the honour and respect which are due to men, to each according to the rank, and authority he holds in the world, and contents nothing but Vice. On the contrary, they who are of a mean and weak spirit, are apt to flatter in excesses, sometimes by reverencing, and fearing things

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Just so, worthy of contempt, sometimes by violently disdaining such as desire so be reverence; and they often slip suddenly from extreme impiy to superstition, thence again from superstition to impiy, so that there is no vice, nor irregularity of spirit which they are not subject to.

The 165 Article.

Of Hope, and Fear.

Hope is a disposition of the Soul to persuade her that what she desires shall come to passe, which is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, to wit, by those of Joy and desire mixed together: and Fear is another disposition of the Soul which persuades her that it shall not come to passe, and it is to be noted that though these two Passions be contrary to one another, yet a man may have them both together, to wit, when he fancies to himself several reasons, whereof some make him conceive the accomplishment of his Desire is easy, the other make it seeme difficult.

The 166 Article.

Of Security, and Despaire.

And one of these Passions never accompanies Desire, but it leaves room for the other; for when
M. De Charchier, on

when Hope is so strong, that it utterly expelld
Fear, it alters the nature thereof; and is called
Security; and when a man is sure that what he
believeth shall come to pass, though hee still wish
that it would come, yet he nevthertheless ceaseth to
be agitated with the Pasion of Desire, which
made him seek after the event with anxiety. In
like manner when Fear is so extream, that it
takes away all kind of Hope, it converts into
Despaire: and this Despaire fancying the thing
impossible, clearly extinguisheth Desire, which
only is bent on things possible.

The 167th Article.

Of Jealousie.

Jealousie is a sort of Feare, relating to the
Desire a man hath to keep the possession of
some good; and it proceeds not so much
from strength of reason, which makes him con-
jecture he may lose it, as the great value he sets
on it which causeth him to dive into the least
occasions of suspicion, and take them for very
considerable arguments.

The 168 Article.

Wherein this Pasion may be laudable.

And because a man ought more carefully to
keep great goods, than heele, this Pasion
may be just and laudable on some occasions;
as for example, a Captain that guards a place
of great importance, ought to be jealous of it,
that is, mistrust all means whereby it may be
taken: and an honest woman is not to be blam-
ed for being jealous of her honour, that is,
not only beware of doing ill, but also avoid even
the least occasions of detraction.

The 169 Article.

Wherein it is blameworthy.

But a covetous man is to be laught at when he,
is jealous of his treasure, that is, when hee,
broods over it with his eyes, and will never be
farse from it, lest it should be stolen from him;
for money is not worth keeping with so much
care; and a man that is jealous of his wife is
condemned, because it is an evidence hee loves
her not as he should doe, and hath either an ill
opinion of himselfe, or her. I say he loves her
not as he should doe; for if he bore a true Love
to her, hee would never be inclined to mistrust

H  her:
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Of Irresolution.

Irresolution also is a sort of Fear, which causing the Soul to waver between several actions that the man doth, is the cause she cannot execute any, and thereby the hath time to choose before she determines on them. Whereof, truly, some good use may be made: but when it lasts longer than it ought, and it takes up that time to debate, which is required to act, it is very evil. Now, I say it is a sort of Fear, though it may so fall out, when a man hath choice of many things while good she is equally apparent, that he may be at a stand and irresolute, and yet not be afraid. For this sort of Irresolution comes onely from the subject presented, and not from any emotion of the spirit: Wherefore it is not a Passion, unless the fear of failing in his choice creareth the uncertainty. But this fear is so Urlial, and so strong in some, that oftentimes, although they have not any choyce, and though they see only one thing to take, or leave, yet it seizes on them, and causeth them unprofitably to stop there, and search after others; and then it is an excess of Irresolution, which proceeds from too great a desire to doe well, and an imbécillity in the understanding, which having no clear and distinct notions, hath only a great company of confused ones. Wherefore the remedy against this excess is, to accustom a mans selfe. to frame certaine, and determinate Judgements, concerning all things that present themselves, and conceive he doth always do his duty, when he doth what he conceives to be best, though it may be he conceives amisse.

The 171 Article.

Of Courage, and Boldness.

Courage, when it is a Passion, and not a habit or natural inclination, is a certain heat or agitation which disposeth the Soul to addight her powerfully to the execution of the things she will doe, of what nature soever they be; and Boldness is a sort of Courage that disposeth the Soul to the execution of things most dangerous.
The 172 Article.

Of Emulation.

AND Emulation also is a sort of it, but in another sense; for Courage may be considered as a kind (or Genus) that is divided into as many sorts (or Species) as there are several objects, and as many more as it hath causes. In the first sense Boldness is a sort, in the other Emulation; and this last is nothing else but a heat, which disposeth the Soul to undertake things that the hopes may succeed with her, because she sees them succeed with others; and so it is a sort of Courage, whose external cause is example. I say, the external cause, because it ought ever (besides that) to have an internal one which consists in this, that the body is so disposeth, as Desire, and Hope are stronger to drive abundance of blood to the heart, than Fear or Despair to hinder it.

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The 173 Article.

How Boldness depends on Hope.

For it is to be noted, that although the object of Boldness be difficulty, from whence commonly ensues Fear or even Despair, so that it is in most dangerous and desperate affairs that most Boldness and Courage is required; nevertheless there must be some Hope, or else a man must be assured that the end he propounds to himself shall succeed, to oppose himself vigorously against the difficulties he shall encounter. But this end is different from this object. For he can not be assured, and despairing of the same thing at the same time. So when the stole themselves in the midst of their enemies, and ran upon a certain death, the object of their Boldness was the difficulty of keeping their lives in this action, of which difficulty they utterly despaired, for they were sure to the, but their end was to animate their souldiers by their example, and make them winne the victory, of which they had Hope; or else, their end was to get Fame after their death, whereof they were assurred.
The 174 Article.

Of Cowardice, and fearfulness.

Cowardice is directly opposite to Courage, and is a languishing or coldness which hinders the Soul from addicting herself to the execution of things which she would doe, if she were exempted from this Passion. And fearfulness or affright, the contrary to Boldness, is not onely a coldness, but a distraction and astonishment of the Soul, that robs her of the power to resist evils which she thinks are near her.

The 175 Article.

Of the use of Cowardice.

Now, although I cannot be perswaded that nature hath bestowed on man any Passion, that is always vicious, and hath not some good and laudable use; yet I am very much puzzled to divine what these two are good for. Only, I think, Cowardice is of some use when it caueth a man to be free from paines, he might be incited to take, for reasons like truths, if other more certain truths which make them be judged unprofitable, had not invited this Passion in him. For besides her exemption of the Soul from these paines, it is then also very useful to the Body, for that regarding the motion of the spirits, it hinders the forces thereof from being dissipate. But is commonly very hurtful, because it diverts the Will from profitable Actions. And because it proceeds from hence, that a man hath not Hope, or Desire enough: to correct it, he need only augment these two Passions in himselfe.

The 176 Article.

Of the use of Fearfulness.

As for Fearfulness or affright, I see not how it can ever be laudable, or useful. Neither is it one particular Passion, but onely an excess of Cowardice, astonishment, and Fear, which is always vicious; as Boldness is an excess of Courage, ever good, provided the end proposed be good. And because the chief cause of Fearfulness is surprise, there is no better way to be rid of it, than to use premeditation, and prepare ourselves against all events, the fear whereof may cause them.
Remorse of conscience is a sort of Sadness, which comes from the scruple a man hath, that a thing he hath done, or hath not done, is not good. And it necessarily presupposes doubt. For if he had been absolutely assured that what he did had been evil, he had refrained from doing it; since the Will inclines us not to any things but such as have an appearance of goodness. And if he were assured that what he hath already done were evil it would breed repentance, and not only Remorse. Now, the use of this Passion is to make him examine whether the thing he doubts of be good or no, and to hinder him from doing it another time, if he be not assured that it is good. But because it presupposeth an evil, the best way were, never to be subject to feel it; and it may be prevented the same way, as a man may be exempted of Irresolution.

Desire is a sort of Joy mingled with Hatred which proceeds from this, that a man perceives some little evil in a person, whereof he thinks him worthy. He hates this evil, and rejoices to see it in one that is worthy of it. And when this comes unexpectedly, the surprize of Admiration caueth him to break out into laughter, according to what hath formerly been said of the nature of Laughter. But this evil must be a small one: for if it be great, it cannot be thought that he who hath it is worthy of it, unless one be of a very ill nature, or bear him a great deal of Hatred.

Why the most defective men are commonly the greatest Deriders.

And it is seen that they who have apparent defects, for example, who are lame, one-eyed, crook backed, or have received some affront publickly, are peculiarly inclined to derision. For desiring to see all other men as much disgraced as themselves, they rejoice at the ills that befall them, and think them worthy of it.
The 180 Article.
Of the Use of Jeasting.

As for modest jeasting, which wholesome-ly reprehends vices by making them appear ridiculous, so a man laugh not at them himself, nor shew any hatred against persons, it is not a Passion, but a becoming quality in a man, that makes the liveliness of his disposition appear, and the tranquillity of his Soul, which are marks of Vertue; and oftines the nimbleness of his wit too, in that he knowes how to let a handieome glossie on things he jeasts at.

The 181 Article.
Of the Use of Laughter in Jeasting.

And it is not unhandieome to laugh at the hearing of another mans jeasts: nay, per-chance they may be such, that it were doltishnes not to laugh at them. But when a man jeasts himselfe, it is more seemly to abstaine from it, that he may not seeme to be surprized by the things he speakes, nor admire the dexterity of their invention: and that causeth those who hear them to be surprized so much the more.

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The 182 Article.
Of Envy.

That which commonly is called Envy is a vice that consists in a perversi[tke of nature, which causeth certaine men to fret at the good, that, they see, befalls other men. But I here use this word, to signifie a Passion which is not alwayses vicious. Envy then, as it is a Passion, is a sort of Sadness mixed with Hatred which comes from seeing goods beside those we thinke unworthy of it. Which cannot be thought with reason, but of the goods of fortune. For, as for those of the Soul, yea and the Body too, seeing a man hath them by birth, it is to be sufficiently worthy of them, that he received them from God before he was capable to commit any evill.

The 183 Article.
How it may be just, or unjust.

But when fortune sends goods to any one, whereof he is truly unworthy, and Envy is not excited in us but because naturally loving justice, we are vexed that it is not observed in the distribution of those goods, it is a zeal that may be excusable; especially when the good a
man envies others, is of such a nature that it may turn to an evil in their hands, as if it be some command or office in the exercising whereof they may misdeem themselves. Yea, even when he desires that good for himself, and cannot get it, because others less worthy possess it. This makes this passion become the more violent: and yet it may be excusable, provided the hatred in it relate only to the ill distribution of the thing envied, and not to the persons that possess, or distribute it. But there are few who are so just and generous as to bear no hatred against those that prevent them, in the acquisition of a good that is not communicable to many, and that they desired for themselves, though they who acquired it are as much or more worthy of it. And what is most usually envied is Glory. For although that of others doth not hinder us from aspiring thereunto, yet it makes the access to it more difficult, and enhanceth the price.

The 184 Article.

From whence it comes that envious men have sallow complexions.

Besides, there is no vice so banefull to the felicity of man as Envy. For, besides that those who are tainted with it afflict themselves, they also, to the utmost of their power trouble the delight of others. And they have commonly, sallow

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Sallow complexions, that is, a pale mingled with yellow and black, and like blood in a bruise. Whence, Envy is called in Latine Liver; which agrees very well with what hath been said here before of the motions of the blood in Spleen, and Liver; for this causeth the yellow choler comming from the lower part of the Liver, and the black comming from the Spleen, to spread from the heart through the Arteries into all the veins: and that causeth the blood of the veins to have less heat, and flow more slowly than ordinarily, which is sufficient to make the complexion livid. But because choler, as well yellow as black, may be also sent into the veins by many other causes, and Envy may not drive enough into them to alter the colour of the complexon, unless it be exceeding great, and of long continuance, it ought not to be thought that all those of this complexion are thereunto inclined.

The 185 Article.

Of Pitty.

Pitty is a sort of Sadness, mingled with Love or good will towards those whom we see suffer any evil, whereas we esteem them unworthy; so it is contrary to Envy, because of its object, and Design, because it considers them in another manner.
The 186 Article.

**Who are most Pittifull.**

Those who feel themselves very weak, and subject to the adversities of Fortune, seem to be more inclined to this Passion than any else, because they fancy the evil of another, as possible to befall them, and so they are moved to pity, rather out of the love they bear themselves, than that they bear to others.

The 187 Article.

**How the most generous men are sensible of this Passion.**

But nevertheless they who are most generous, and have the greatest spirits, so that they fear not any evil to themselves, and hold themselves above the power of fortune, are not exempted from Compassion, when they see the infirmity of other men, and hear their complaints; for it is a part of Generosity to bear good will to every man: but the Sadness of this Pitty is not bitter, and like that which tragical actions perforated on the stage cause, is more in the externs and the senses, than the interious of the Soul, which in the mean while is satisfied to think she hath done her duty, in that she hath a fellow feeling with

The 188 Article.

**Who those are that are not sensible of it.**

But there are none but malignant, and envious spirits, who naturally hate all men, or else those who are so belittled, and blinded by good fortune, or desperate through ill, that they think no further evil can befall them, who are insensible of Pitty.
The 189 Article.

Why this Passion excites weeping.

Now, a man weeps easily in this Passion, because Love sending much blood to the heart, causeth many vapours to issue through the eyes; and the coldness of Sadness retarding the agitation of these vapours, converts them into tears, as hath been formerly said.

The 190 Article.

Of Satisfaction of ones selfe.

The Satisfaction that they have, who constantly follow the paths of vertue, is a habit in their Soul called Tranquility, or quiet of conscience; but that which a man acquires anew, when he hath lately done any action that he thinks good, is a Passion, to wit, a sort of Joy, which I believe, is the softest of all, because the cause thereof depends only on our selves; yet when this cause is not just, that is, when the actions from whence we deduce this Satisfaction are not of consequence, or else are vicious, it is ridiculous, and leaves only to produce a Pride, and impertinent Arrogance, which may particularly be observed in those who believing themselves to be devout, are only hypocritical, and

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and superstitious, that is, who under pretence of frequenting the Church, saying, many Prayers, wearing short hair, fasting, giving alms, suppose they are exquisitely perfect, and imagine they are God's intimate friends, that they can doe nothing that can displeae him, and whatsoever their Passions dictate to them is a good Zeale: although it sometime dictate to them the greatest crimes that can be committed by men, as betraying of Cities, murdering of Princes, exterminating whole Nations, merely for this, that they are not of their opinion.

The 191 Article.

Of Repentance.

Repentance is directly contrary to Satisfaction of ones selfe: and is a sort of Sadness proceeding from a belief that a man hath done some evil action; and it is very bitter, because the cause comes only from our selves. Yet nevertheless, this hinders it not from being very usefull, when it is true, that the action we repent of is evil, and that we have a certain knowledge thereof, because it incites us to do better another time; but it oftentimes comes to pafs, that weak spirits repent the things they have done, not knowing certainly that they are evil: they persuade themselves, only because they fear it is so, and had they done the contrary, they had repented.
Gratitude is also a sort of Love, excited in us by some Action of him to whom we offer it, and whereby we believe he hath done us some good, or at least had an intention to do us some. So it includes all that Goodwill doth, and this besides, that it is grounded on an Action we are very sensible of, and whereof we have a desire to make a requital. Wherefore it is far more strong, especially in Souls never so little noble and generous.

The 194 Article.

Of Ingratitude.

For Ingratitude, it is not a Passion: for nature never put any motion of the spirits in us to excite it: but it is only a vice directly opposite to Gratitude, seeing this is ever virtuous, and one of the principal bonds of humane society. Wherefore this vice appertaines to none but bellumine men, and the foolishly arrogant, who thinke all things their due; or the fottish, who reflect not on the good deeds they receive; or else the weak, and abject, who feeling their own infirmite and necessity, basely seek affittance from
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The 196 Article.

Why it is sometimes joined with Pity, and sometimes with Derision.

To do an evil, is also in some respects to receive one, from whence it comes that some with their Indignation join Pity, and others derision: according as they bear a good or ill Will towards those whom they see commit faults. Thus the laughter of Democritus, and the weeping of Heraclitus, might proceed from the same cause.

The 197 Article.

That it is often accompanied with Admiration, and is not incompatible with Joy.

Indignation is also oftimes accompanied with Admiration. For we use to think that all things shall be done in the same manner we conceive they ought to be done, that is, after that manner which we esteem good. Wherefore when it falls out otherwise it surprizeth us, and we Admire it. Nor is it incompatible with Joy, although it most commonly is joined with Sadness. For when the evil we bear an Indignation against cannot hurt us, and we consider that we would not doe the like, it gives us some delight: and this

from others, and after they have received it hate them: because having no Will to return the like, or despaiting ever to doe it, and imagining the whole world as mercenary as themselves, and that none doe good but with Hope of being rewarded for it, they think they have desired it.

The 195 Article.

Of Indignation.

Indignation is a sort of Hatred or Aversion, that a man naturally beares to those who doe some evil, of what nature soever it be. And it is often mixed with Envy, or Pity, but yet the object thereof is altogether different from them. For he carres an Indignation onely against those who doe good or evil to persons unworthy of it: but he envies those who receive this good, and pittes those who receive this evil. It is true, in some respects it is evil to possess a good whereof a man is not worthy. Which may be the reason wherefore Aristotle and his followers, supposing that Envy is alwayes a vice, have called that Indignation which is not vicious.

The
The 198 Article.

Of the use of it.

Furthermore, Indignation is observed to be more in those who would seem virtuous, than those who really are. For although they who love virtue cannot without some Aversion look upon the vices of others, they are Passionate only against the great and extraordinary ones. For it is to be nice, and squamish, to have much Indignation for things of little concernment; it is to be unjust to have any for those which are not blameworthy; and it is to be impertinent and absurd not to confine this Passion to the Actions of men, but extend them to the works of God or nature: as they do who being never contented with their condition or fortune, dare control the government of the world, and the secrets of providence.

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The 199 Article.

Of Wrath.

Wrath is also a sort of Hatred or Aversion, against those that have done any evil, or endeavoured to hurt, not indifferently any thing whatsoever, but particularly our selves. So it contains all Indignation doth, and this besides, that it is grounded upon an action that we are sensible of, and whereof we have a Desire to be revenged. For this Desire almost ever accompanies it, and is directly opposite to Gratitude as Indignation is to Goodwill. But it is, without compare, more violent than these other three Passions, because the desire to repel things hurtfull, and be revenged, is most vehement of all. It is this desire, joyned to selfe-love, that furnisheth Wrath with all the agitation of blood that Courage and Boldness can cause: and Hatred specially causeth the colerick blood, that comes from the spleen, and the little veines of the liver, which receives this agitation, and gets into the heart: or because of its abundance, and the nature of the choler wherewith it is mingled, it excites a sharper and more ardent heat, than can be excited therein either by Love, or Joy.
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agues that begin with cold fits, are usually the violentest.

The 201 Article.

That of these two sorts of Wrath, they who have most goodness are most subject to the first.

This informs us that two sorts of Wrath may be distinguished; one sudden, and exteriorly manifest, but yet of small efficacy, and easily appeased; the other not so apparent at first, but that gnawes more on the heart, and hath more dangerous effects. Thos who have much goodness and Love are the most subject to the first; for it proceeds not from any deep Hatred, but from a sudden Aversion, that surpriseth them, because being addicted to imagine that all things ought to be carried the way they conceive to be best, as soon as any thing falls out otherwise they admire it, and are angry at it, oftentimes too, when the thing concerns not them in particular, because being full of affection, they interest themselves in the behalf of those they love, as if it were for themselves; so what would only be an occasion of Indignation to another, is to them of Wrath; and because their inclination to Love makes them always have a great deal of heat and blood in the heart, the Aversion that surpriseth them that drives never so little choler thither,
M. des Cartes, on

either, causeth immediately a great emotion in
this blood, but this emotion is not lasting, be-
cause the strength of the surprise continues not,
and as soon as they perceive that the occasion
that incenceth them ought not to have moved
them so, they repent thereof.

The 202 Article.

That weak, and mean souls, suffer
themselves most to be swayed
with the other.

The other sort of Wrath, wherein Hatred, and
Sadness predominates, is not at first so appar-
ent, unless that, it may be, it make the face look
pale; but the strength thereof is increaseth by lit-
tle and little, by the agitation which an ardent
Desire of revenge excites in the blood, which be-
ing mixed with choler driven to the heart from
the lower part of the Liver, and the Spleen, ex-
cites therein a very sharp, and prickling heat, and
as the most generous souls are full of Grati-
tude, so they, who are proudest, meanest, and
lowest give themselves up most to this sort of
Wrath; for injuries appear so much the greater,
as Pride makes a man esteem himselfe higher:
and also seeing how much more a man esteemes
the goods they depiole him of, which he values
the more, the lower and meaner that his Soul is,
because they are extraneous.

The Passions of the Soul. 165

The 203 Article.

That Generosity is a remedy against the
excesses thereof.

Besides, although this Passion be useful to
conferre vigour on us to repell injuries, never-
theless, there is not any one, whose excesses
ought to be avoided with more care: because by
disturbing the Judgement, they oft-times cause a
man to commit faults, whereof he afterwards
repents: yes, and sometimes hinder him from
repelling injuries so well as he might have done,
had he had less emotion. But as nothing makes
it more excessive than Pride, so, I believe, Gener-
osity is the best remedy against the excesses of
it: because making a man esteem but very little
all such goods as may be taken away, and on the
other side highly value the liberty and absolute
empire over himselfe, which he ceases to have
when anything can offend him, it makes him
only below Contempt, or at the most Indigna-
tion on the injuries others use to bee offend-
ed at.

I 2
The 204 Article.

Of Glory.

What I here call Glory is a sort of Joy, grounded on self-Love, and comes from an opinion of Hope a man hath to be praised by some others. So it differs from inward Satisfaction, which proceeds from an opinion of having done a good action: for a man is often applauded for things that are not believed to be good, and blamed for those that are believed to be better; but both of them are sorts of self-Estimations, as well as sorts of Joy, for it is an occasion for a man to esteem himselfe, to see that he is esteemed by others.

The 205 Article.

Of Shame.

On the contrary, Shame is a sort of Sadness, grounded also on self-Love, and proceeds from an opinion, or a Fear a man hath to be blamed, it is besides a sort of modesty, or Humility, and mistrust of one's selfe: for when a man esteemes himselfe so highly, that he cannot imagine any one can contemne him, he cannot easily be ashamed.

The Passions of the Soul.

The 206 Article.

Of the use of these two Passions.

Now, there is the same use of Glory, and Shame, in that they incite us to Virtue, one by Hope, the other by Fear; it is only needfull to instruct the Judgement, concerning what is truly blameworthy or laudable, not to be ashamed of well-doing, and not to boast of vices, as many doe; but it is not good absolutely to divide our selves of these Passions, as the Cynicks did heretofore: for although the people judge very waywardly, yet since we cannot live without them, and that it behoves us to be esteemed by them, we ought oftentimes to follow their opinions rather than our own, concerning the exterior part of our actions.

The 207 Article.

Of Impudence.

Impudence which is a Contempt of Shame, and oft of Glory, is not a Passion, because there is not any peculiar motion in us that excites it; but it is a vice opposite to Shame, and also to Glory, where either of them are good: as Ingratitude is opposite to Gratitude, and Cruelty to Pity. And the chief cause of Impudence comes.
The Passions of the Soul.

The 209 Article.

Of Sorrow.

Sorrow is also a sort of Sadness, which hath a peculiar bitterness in that it is ever joyed to some despaise, and remembrance of the delight we took in enjoying it: for we are never sorry for any goods but those we have enjoyed, and which are to lost that we have no hope to recover them at that time, and in that manner as we sorrow for them.

The 10 Article.

Of Lightheartedness.

Lastly, that which I call Lightheartedness, is a sort of Joy, which hath this thing peculiar to it, that the sweetness of it is augmented by the remembrance of misfortunes suffered, whereof a man feeleth himselfe eased as if he felt himselfe discharged of a heavy burden, he had long born on his shoulders. And I see nothing very remarkeable in these three Passions; nor have I placed them here, but to follow the method of my former enumeration. But, me thinks, this Enumeration was usefull to shew that we have not omitted any, which was worthy of peculiar consideration.
The Passions of the Soul.

by the blood that the heart sends thither. So they who are much addicted by nature to the emotions of Joy, or Pity, or Cheerfulness, or Wrath, cannot refrain from swooning, weeping, trembling, or having the blood stirred as if they had a Fever, when their fancy is thoroughly sensible by an object of any of these Passions. But what may be done on such an occasion, and what I think to lay down here as the most general remedy, and the easiest to be practised, against all exorbitances of the Passions is, that when a man perceives his blood thus moved, he ought to be wary, and remember that whatsoever is presented to our Imagination, tends to the delusion of the Soul, and makes reasons that serve to persuade the object of Passions appear farre stronger than they are, and those which serve to dissuade, farre weaker. And when Passion persuades things, the execution whereof admits of some delay, he must abstain from giving his judgement thereon immediately, and divert himselfe from it to other thoughts, untill time, and rest, have wholly allayed the emotion in the blood. And lastly, when it incites to actions, concerning which resolutions are instantly to be taken, the Will must peculiarly dedicate it selfe to consider and follow the reasons repugnant to those which the passion presents, although they appear less weighty; as when a man is suddenly assaulted by an enemy, occasion doth not give him leave to waste any time in debate: but what

And now we know them all, we have left reason to fear them, than we had before. For we see that naturally they are all good, and that we ought to avoid only the ill use of them, or their excesses: for which the remedies I have laid down may suffice, if every man were careful enough to practise them. But because I have put Premeditation and Industry among these remedies, whereby the defects of nature may be corrected, by using to separate the motions of the blood & spirits in ones self, from the thoughts wherewith they use to be joyned, I confess, few men are thus prepared against all encounters: and that these motions excited in the blood, by the objects of Passions, doe so immediately follow the mere impressions in the brain, and the disposition of the organs, although the Soul be no way contributive, that no humane wisdom is able to resist them, when one is not enough prepared. So, many cannot refrain from laughing when they are tickled, though they take no delight in it: for the impression and surprize of Joy that hath made them laugh formerly on the same occasion, being awakened in their fancy, makes their lungs be blown upon a sudden whether they will or no, by

A general remedy against the Passions.
it seems, those who are accustomed to make a
reflexion on their own actions, may do; that is,
when they feel themselves struck with an Af
fright; they will endeavour to divert their
thoughts from the consideration of the danger,
by representing to themselves the reasons where
fore there is more safety and honour in resistance
than flight; and on the contrary, when they feel
the desire of revenge, and Wrath incite them, to
rush inconsiderately on those who befoil them,
they should call to mind, that it is indiscretion
to destroy themselves, when they may be sa
ved without dishonour; and if there be too
much odds, it is better to make a handsome re
treat, or take quarter, than savagely to expose
themselves to a certain death.

The 212 Article.

That from them alone all the good and evil
of this life depend.

Now the Soul may have her delights distinctly
by her self: but for those which are common
to her with the body, they absolutely depend on
the Passions; so that those men whom they
move most may be apt to taste most sweetness
in this life. It is true, they may also find the
most bitterness, when they do not understand
how